Certificate Based Security Mechanisms in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks based on IEC 61850 and IEEE WAVE Standards

Abstract

When equipped with an on-board wireless kit, electric vehicles (EVs) can communicate with nearby entities, e.g., road side units (RSUs), via a vehicle ad-hoc network (VANET). More observability enables smart charging algorithms where charging stations (CSs) are allocated to EVs based on their current state of charge, destination, and urgency to charge. IEEE 1609 WAVE standard regulates VANETs, while IEC 61850 is emerging as the smart grid communication standard. In order to integrate these two domains of energy management, past research has focused on harmonizing these two standards for a full smart city solution. However, this solution requires very sensitive data to be transmitted, such as ownership of EV, owners’ personal details, and driving history. Therefore, data security in these networks is of prime concern and needs to be addressed. In this paper, different security mechanisms defined by the IEEE 1609 WAVE standard are applied for both vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) communication. The former relates to EV–RSU, while the latter covers EV–CS communication. The implicit and explicit certificate mechanism processes proposed in IEEE 1609 WAVE for authentication are studied in great detail. Furthermore, a performance evaluation for these mechanisms is presented in terms of total time lapse for authentication, considering both the computational time and communication time delays. These results are very important in understanding the extra latency introduced by security mechanisms. Considering that VANETs may be volatile and may disappear as EVs drive away, overall timing performance becomes vital for operation. Reported results show the magnitude of this impact and compare different security mechanisms. These can be utilized to further develop VANET security approaches based on available time and the required security level.

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