2002
DOI: 10.1007/bf02755984
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

CEO ownership, corporate control, and bank performance

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

8
34
2
4

Year Published

2009
2009
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 63 publications
(49 citation statements)
references
References 18 publications
8
34
2
4
Order By: Relevance
“…In addition, Griffith et al (2002) find no relationship between performance and board composition, thus confirming the results of Pi and Timme (1993). Similarly, Adams and Mehran (2005) reveal that the percentage of outside directors has no effect on the market performance of banks and accounting.…”
Section: H6 the Presence Of Institutional Directors On The Board Hassupporting
confidence: 76%
“…In addition, Griffith et al (2002) find no relationship between performance and board composition, thus confirming the results of Pi and Timme (1993). Similarly, Adams and Mehran (2005) reveal that the percentage of outside directors has no effect on the market performance of banks and accounting.…”
Section: H6 the Presence Of Institutional Directors On The Board Hassupporting
confidence: 76%
“…In the banking sector, The Basel committee recommends that banks establish boards that are composed of an effective number of directors capable of exercising judgment that are independent of the views of management, large shareholders and governments (BIS, 2006). Regarding the presence of independent directors, many authors find no significant relation between the degree of board independence and performance (Pi & Timme, 1993;Griffith et al, 2002;Choi & Hasan, 2005;Adams & Mehran, 2008). Also, Simpson and Gleason (1999) conclude that independent directors do not influence the probability of American banks.…”
Section: Independent Directorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Griffith, Fogelberg, and Weeks (2002) find that the relation between CEO ownership and bank performance is non-monotonic: as CEO ownership rises, bank performance first rises, then declines, and finally rises again. DeYoung, Spong, and Sullivan (2001) study a sample of small banks.…”
Section: Insider Ownership and Bank Performancementioning
confidence: 87%
“…Motivated by the importance of banks, many papers examine the influence of insider ownership and power on bank performance (e.g., Allen and Cebenoyan, 1991;Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert, 1999;Griffith, Fogelberg, and Weeks, 2002;Hughes et al, 2003;Gulamhussen, Pinheiro, and Sousa, 2012). Most of these papers assume that insider power is equal to (a function of) insider ownership.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%