2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2024484
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CEO Network Centrality and Merger Performance

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Cited by 71 publications
(138 citation statements)
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“…Fracassi and Tate () document that CEO–Director social connectedness leads to weaker monitoring and more value‐destroying mergers. El‐Khatib et al () find that centrally positioned CEOs bid more and these merger deals carry greater value losses to the acquirer as well as the combined entity. Due to the inherent endogeneity of valuation in our setting, we leave a more in‐depth analysis of this promising research question to future work.…”
Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Fracassi and Tate () document that CEO–Director social connectedness leads to weaker monitoring and more value‐destroying mergers. El‐Khatib et al () find that centrally positioned CEOs bid more and these merger deals carry greater value losses to the acquirer as well as the combined entity. Due to the inherent endogeneity of valuation in our setting, we leave a more in‐depth analysis of this promising research question to future work.…”
Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, our study adds to the emerging literature on the effect of social networks on corporate decision‐making. El‐Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik () show that CEOs with higher network centrality measures engage in more and value‐destroying acquisitions. Engelberg et al () document that social connections between banks and borrowers through managerial interpersonal linkages reduce borrowing costs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since networks both enhance reputation benefits (e.g., spread good reviews, create job opportunities) and punish deviance (Burt, ; Brass and Labianca, ), more central managers have both greater ability to communicate and greater incentive to comply with explicit and implicit expectations. Centrality also mitigates the ability of managers to misinform market participants (Fogel, Jandik, and McCumber, ) and lowers the incentive to distort information if the network effects lower performance turnover sensitivity (El‐Khatib et al., ) or increase the likelihood of being hired elsewhere (Liu, ). Thus, ceteris paribus, more central managers are more likely to disclose and to disclose more valuable information that, in turn, may decrease adverse selection and improve stock liquidity.…”
Section: Related Literature and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Table 8, which shows the positive link between powerful independent directors and bidder and total M&A announcement CARs, is subjected to additional robustness checks. The Table 8 regressions include CEO power measures because El-Khatib et al (2013) find that CEOs with high social network centrality supervise value destroying M&A activity. Table 8 is the sole set of results in which CEO power is significant.…”
Section: Robustness Checksmentioning
confidence: 99%