CEO identity and labor contracts: Evidence from CEO transitions

Bach, Laurent; Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.009

Cited by 56 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…In addition there is a working paper by Bach & Serrano-Velarde (2011), which addresses the same topic. All of these three studies are using data on French firms and find support for the idea that family firms are offering implicit employment insurance in return for lower wages.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms

Bjuggren

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract In this study I present empirical evidence that employment in family firms is less sensitive to performance and product market fluctuations, both at the industry and at the firm level. This supports the idea that family firms are able to offer their employees implicit employment protection. Family firms are believed to have longer time horizons, and are as owners more easily identified with their company and its actions. Terms of use: Documents inThese are features that could make family firms more cautious in terms of adjusting their employment. I confirm previous findings that family firms are less sensitive to sales fluctuations at the industry level and I show that this also holds for fluctuations in value added. I extend the analysis to show that family firms are less sensitive to unanticipated industry shocks by filtering out the trend component. When investigating idiosyncratic shocks to the firm, I find that family firms are less anxious to translate temporary shocks in performance into changes in employment. By using full population data from tax registers, I am able to identify all family firms, both listed and non-listed. This has previously not been feasible.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms

Bjuggren

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…The studies are, in addition to performance, concerned with issues related to labor economics, labor contracts, wages and risk behavior. This field is represented by for example Sraer & Thesmar (2007), Bennedsen et al (2007), Bassanini et al (2011), Bach & Serrano-Velarde (2011. It is my belief and hope that this segment of the family firm literature will expand and establish itself as a persistent field within economics.…”

Section: Research On Family Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The specific inquiry of how sensitive family firms are to industry shocks has only been investigated in one previous study by Sraer & Thesmar (2007). In addition there are a few studies that are closely related to the topic (Lee 2006, Block 2010, Bach & Serrano-Velarde 2011, D'Aurizio & Romano 2013. This essay therefore contributes to a field where there is so far a limited number of empirical studies.…”

Section: Sensitivity To Shocks In Family Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family Matters: Essays on Family Firms and Employment Protection

Bjuggren¹

2013

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“…Family owners might be also more inclined to honour implicit contracts with employees or resort to alternative mechanisms (e.g. trust, reputation) to secure firm‐specific investments (Bach and Serrano‐Velarde ; Sraer and Thesmar ). These values and commitments substitute for BLER, thereby reducing the anticipated benefits that BLER generate for the employees.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Employees Choose to Be Represented on the Board of Directors? Empirical Analysis of Board‐Level Employee Representation in Denmark

Gregorič

Poulsen

2019

Brit J Industrial Rel

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Drawing on transaction costs economics and longitudinal data on Danish corporations, we analyse the distribution of board-level employee representation(BLER) and the characteristics of employee directors in a context where workers have the possibility (but not also an obligation) to nominate representatives to the board of directors. We show that BLER is less likely instituted in firms with CEO or family-related members on the board, but more likely observed in larger, older firms and in those with high firm-specific human capital and union density. Firm-specific human capital, qualifications and union membership also determine individual worker's probability to become a board member.

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CEO identity and labor contracts: Evidence from CEO transitions

Cited by 56 publications

References 29 publications

Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms

Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms

Family Matters: Essays on Family Firms and Employment Protection

When Do Employees Choose to Be Represented on the Board of Directors? Empirical Analysis of Board‐Level Employee Representation in Denmark

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