Centros and Defensive Regulatory Competition: Some Thoughts and a Glimpse at the Data

Abstract

This paper looks at the phenomenon of "defensive regulatory competition" in European corporate law following Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art. In order to retain control over the corporate governing private limited entities operating within their territories and to prevent the proliferation of "foreign limited" formations, Member States have modified some of the features of their laws that company founders considers most unattractive, such as minimum capital and time-consuming incorporation procedures. The first part of the paper analyzes the market for the law governing privately held firms, drawing from the debate in the United States. The US and Europe differ in that regulatory competition, as far as substantive law is concerned, focuses mainly on ex post mechanisms such as directors' duties and veil piercing. By contrast, European competition seems to be driven by ex ante issues relating to firm formation, such as minimum capital. The second part of the paper draws from an ongoing empirical research project that attempts to explore the effects of regulatory competition and uses reforms in Germany and Belgium as examples. Regression analysis suggests that at least the German 2008 reform had a minor effect on the number of UK private limited companies being set up to do business in Germany.

The Signaling Value of Legal Form in Debt Financing

“…Following the European liberalization, firms took advantage of legal arbitrage opportunities by increasingly incorporating in the UK due to lower minimum capital requirements and setup costs for limited liability firms (Becht et al, 2008). However, since countries aim to control the corporate law on firms operating in their jurisdiction this caused a defensive regulatory competition in European corporate law in response to the liberalization (Gelter, 2019).…”