Centralising Dynamics in Australian Federalism

Abstract

The steady centralisation that is generally held to be a characteristic feature of Australian federalism has occasioned thorough description and regular comment but much less attempt at explanation or theorisation. This paper reviews the way we account for centralisation in federal systems in general and Australian federalism in particular. In doing so, it considers institutional and societal modes of explanation in the context of patterns of difference between the leading federations. It concludes that as far as those broader patterns, or secular trends, are concerned, there is no avoiding a societal explanation — one that highlights the balance between forces of modernisation and the existence of a “federal society”.

Multi-level Governance: Conceptual challenges and case studies from Australia

“…This has been reflected in the strongly normative tone that is evident in much of the literature on Australian federalism, including 'profound disagreement' over its legitimacy and relevance (Fenna 2009: 147). These studies have noted and assessed the impact of long-standing and contemporaneous developments on the character of Australian federalism, such as the relatively high degree of concurrency in key policy domains and the trend towards centralisation Galligan 2008;Fenna 2012). The changing relationship between different tiers of government has, however, been the starting point for much of this scholarship.…”

“…In particular, we can see linkages around issues of power and resources that can set in train systems of coercive federalism, rather than the more pragmatic, collaborative or cooperative forms that exist at times within COAG and other flexible and negotiated systems (Mathews 1977;Fenna 2012;Smullen 2014; Kay; see also Mercer and Jarvie for another collaborative COAG working example). We also see how blurred responsibilities in many areas can lead to tension (see also Painter 2001; Fawcett and Marsh; and Mulgan on accountability), slow progress and a political willingness to 'cut through' with unilateral action to solve the impasse and attempt to 'get the job done' by controlling and directing its implementation.…”

“…There thus remains a dream of being able to centralise power in Australia, as in other countries, with a unified system of government, which is most often lived out here through periods of crisis and is increasingly being enacted little by little (see Fenna 2012 or Smullen 2014 for a more nuanced interpretation). It is also the moment when a governing mentality of 'welfare statism' and the need for strong government intervention to support social development and security, more common in the 1950s, again becomes more acceptable to the voting public (see Dugdale for more discussion on this 'governmentality').…”

Multi-level Governance and the Study of Australian Federalism

“…In response, Fenna (2012) argues that whatever the superficial attractions of the notion of a pragmatic federalism, it lacks a theoretical underpinning and therefore explanatory power. At best, the term offers a label for the mechanisms of intergovernmental adjustment but the challenge, for Fenna, is to articulate underlying general tendencies to centralisation in Australian federalism as well as account for observed sectoral variations in how pragmatic adjustments have played out in practice.…”

What Remains Unwritten? Developing a Critical Evaluation of Multi-level Governance and its Futures in Australian Public Policy and Politics

“…In particular, we can see linkages around issues of power and resources that can set in train systems of coercive federalism, rather than the more pragmatic, collaborative or cooperative forms that exist at times within COAG and other flexible and negotiated systems (Mathews 1977;Hollander and Patapan 2007;Fenna 2012;Smullen 2014; Kay; see also Mercer and Jarvie for another collaborative COAG working example). We also see how blurred responsibilities in many areas can lead to tension (see also Painter 2001; Fawcett and Marsh; and Mulgan on accountability), slow progress and a political willingness to 'cut through' with unilateral action to solve the impasse and attempt to 'get the job done' by controlling and directing its implementation.…”