Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment

Forder, James

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028649

Cited by 98 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…There is some evidence that de facto central bank behavior heavily deviates from de jure rules in developing and transition countries [Forder (1996[Forder ( , 1998, Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004)]. Therefore, we split the sample in OECD (columns (3) and (7)) and non-OECD countries (columns (4) and (8)).…”

Section: Results IImentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

Hielscher

Markwardt

2012

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence Abstract This paper empirically studies the impact of the quality of political institutions on the link between central bank independence and inflation. Making use of data on the evolution of central bank independence over time and controlling for possible nonlinearities, we employ interaction models to identify the conditions under which more central bank independence will enhance a country's inflation performance. Examining a cross-section of up to 69 countries, we are able to show that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily lead to better inflation performance. To lower inflation by increasing independence, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) The change in independence must be sufficiently large, and (2) the quality of the political institutions must be sufficiently high. JEL-Code: E580, E020, E310. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Results IImentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

Hielscher

Markwardt

2012

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Both quotes come from the abstract of Barro & Gordon (1983). I argue more fully in Forder (1998b) that if it does exist, it does not make a case for central bank independence. 38.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy

Forder¹

2002

International Review of Applied Economics

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The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumably attributable to the view that central banks, unimpeded by external forces, pursue the public interest. That presumption has not always been common in the economics literature, even in the discussion of central banking. The theory of bureaucracy suggests that such institutions pursue their own interests. It is here applied to the European central bank as it was in the past to other central banks. First, consideration is given to what is today implied by the view that central banks are primarily interested in maintaining their independence, maximising their discretion, and avoiding blame for poor outcomes. Second, the ECB's explanations of how it sees its role and status and its presentation of its strategy are considered. Certain limitations in the form of obscure explanation, confused analysis and selective referencing are identified. These appear to suggest that the ECB is concerned with the pursuit of its own agenda. Particular attention is drawn to the danger of paying too much attention to what it says about its own 'accountability'.

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“…Il faut rappeler que l'indépendance n'est ni une constante historique (e.g. Forder, 1998), ni nécessaire à la stabilité (e.g. Hayo, 1998).…”

Section: Un Chantier Inachevéunclassified

Passer de l'austérité à l'investissement social, c'est à l'Europe de montrer la voie

Palier¹

2014

Revue De l'OFCE

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Depuis 2010, les plans d’austérité se multiplient en Europe pour faire face à la crise de la dette des États et pour rassurer les marchés. Les mesures adoptées par les différents gouvernements européens, ainsi que les recommandations émises par les instances européennes, sont principalement de trois types : réformes de la protection sociale, privatisations, gel du salaire des fonctionnaires et réduction de leur nombre. Des coupes sont prévues dans les dépenses sociales, des réformes structurelles sont imposées : augmentation de l’âge de départ à la retraite, flexibilisation accrue du marché du travail, baisse des prestations chômage pour rendre le travail plus attractif, heures de travail obligatoire pour les bénéficiaire de l’assistance, compétition renforcée dans le domaine des services sanitaires et sociaux. Ces politiques mènent à la destruction de la cohésion sociale des pays du Sud et de l’Est de l’Europe et ruinent un peu plus encore le peu de solidarité existant entre les peuples européens. L’Europe doit demain montrer la voie des politiques à mener pour l’avenir et soutenir les pays dans les efforts pour investir dans le social.

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Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment

Cited by 98 publications

References 39 publications

The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence

Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy

Passer de l'austérité à l'investissement social, c'est à l'Europe de montrer la voie

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