Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-1997

Lybek, Tonny

doi:10.5089/9781451842029.001

Cited by 40 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(22 reference statements)

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“…Moreover, the more detailed index (with sub-characteristics for each variable) must be supported by a weighting system and a subjective judgement is involved in choosing the characterization of variables and the weights in aggregation. Table 2 presents rankings of central bank independence according to three indices: GMT built for the purpose of this paper, Cukierman et al (1998) (CMN) and Lybek (1999). Since Lybek's study covers only FSU countries, the FSU and the Central European banks are compared separately.…”

Section: The Index Of Central Bank Independence and Comparison With Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

Maliszewski

2000

Economics of Transition

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The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.JEL classification: E5, P2, K1, P16.

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Section: The Index Of Central Bank Independence and Comparison With Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The CMN index does not cover the position of the board. Cukierman et al (1998), Lybek (1999. As previously, the year indicates the year of the latest amendment to the law.…”

Section: The Index Of Central Bank Independence and Comparison With Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

Maliszewski

2000

Economics of Transition

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“…Loungani and Sheets (1997) have established that the central bank independence in transition conditions negatively influences inflation rate, which has also been established by Cukierman (1998), whereas he pointed out necessity for economic liberalization of adequate level. Lybek (1999) has researched connection of the central bank independence and certain macro-economic indicators in former Soviet countries, whereas he included elements of the accountability of the central banks into the model designed for measuring of the independence. His model is more rigorous than Cukiermans's or GMT model, in order to be less influenced by subjective elements when applied.…”

Section: Theoretic Considerations and Researches Of The Central Bank mentioning

confidence: 99%

Some Aspects of Actual CBI and Inflation in the Countries of Southeast Europe

Piplica¹,

Šperanda²,

Perković³

2018

Montenegrin Journal of Economics

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Although the countries of Southeast Europe are connected in many ways, there are a lot differences among them with reference to development of the market economy, and especially in the way of conducting of the monetary policy and achieving of the price stability. The subject of this article's research is the actual central bank independence and its impact on monetary stability in the specific environment of Southeast European countries. Therefore, we applied it TOR as a research method because shorter average duration of the mandate of a central bank governor can be an obstacle for conducting of the monetary policy in the long run, as in such a case central bank would be less interested in obtaining its primary goal -keeping of monetary stability. The main hypothesis in this study is that there was a significant influence of the actual central bank independence to monetary stability, regardless of different implementations of the monetary policies of the central banks of the observed countries. We have used statistical methods to prove the hypotheses and then we gave an adequate explanation of the research results. The result of our research has shown that in the period 2000-2016, despite their differences, actual independence of the respective central banks was strengthening, while the inflation rate in the countries of the Southeast Europe was decreasing, but the connection between the two was weak. However, we have established that in the Southeast European countries in the end relatively higher degree of the actual independence of their central banks has been obtained, as well as lower inflation rate in 2016, while their negative correlation has become very strong. The observed countries can have obtained their monetary stability greatly thanks to the higher degree of the actual independence of their respective central banks, but at the same the independence by itself is not enough to keep the inflation rate at the desired rate, like the one requested by Maastricht's criteria. In modern circumstances lower inflation rate can depend on some other factors, such as political lobbies, mutual adjustment of fiscal and monetary policies, imperfection of the labour market, national culture of the inflation, etc. JEL classification:E52, E58.

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“…By researching actual CBI, the authors concluded that some of the countries were still not free from the political interference. Lybek (1999) used as a measurement an index which constituted 21 indicators, including the elements of measuring central banks' responsibility. The author has established that countries with higher levels of de jure independence and the responsibility of the respective central banks have lower inflation rates in the period -1997.…”

Section: Theoretical Attitudes On the Cbi And An Outline Of The Empirmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal central bank independence and inflation in various phases of transition

Piplica

2015

Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja

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The transition environment of 11 EU member countries has created an exceptional opportunity for research on the influence of legal central bank independence (LCBI) on inflation within significantly different circumstances in comparison to developed Western countries. I construct my own transformed GMT (TGMT) model for estimation of the LCBI, researching transition in its early stages and later on, thus comprising the total period of transition. Even in early stages of the transition LCBI has significantly negative effects on inflation. In later phases all the countries show evidently high levels of the LCBI and low inflation rates, but in this phase increasing the LCBI would not result in decreasing the inflation rate. Only studying the entire period of the transition would show that LCBI has significant negative influence on inflation, clearly showing different levels of the LCBI and inflation, which was not so obvious in shorter intervals. Moreover, negative influence of the LCBI on inflation does not change even if I add budget deficit as an independent variable to my research.

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Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-1997

Cited by 40 publications

References 18 publications

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

Some Aspects of Actual CBI and Inflation in the Countries of Southeast Europe

Legal central bank independence and inflation in various phases of transition

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