Centers of gravity and war outcomes

Abstract

Bargaining models argue that wars usually terminate when the information gap closes enough to create a bargaining range. Although this convergence is assumed to be straightforward, factors that identify the information regarding the likely military outcome to the belligerents have not been identified. One of Clausewitz's main ideas was that states can win wars by attacking the enemy's centers of gravity, which I argue provide an important way through which information convergence is achieved. I examine the importance of three centers of gravity-capturing the enemy's capital, destroying the enemy's military forces, and eliminating enemy allies from the war-on war outcomes through a quantitative analysis of wars from 1816 to 2007. KeywordsCapturing capitals, Clausewitz, information convergence, war outcomes Understanding the factors driving war outcomes is a vital element of understanding international conflict more generally (Biddle, 2007;Stoll, 1995). Although the causes of war have been studied far more extensively, bargaining models of war make it clear that war outcomes are important for understanding the causes of war (Filson and Werner, 2002). Since war has tremendous consequences for international relations and the nature of those consequences is driven in large part by who wins and loses, explaining war outcomes is important in its own right. In a broad empirical analysis of war outcomes, Stam (1996) finds that military strategy is the most important determinant, contrary to the previous conventional wisdom focusing on power.Carl von Clausewitz (1976) has been very influential in understanding strategy and warfare, but his ideas have not been rigorously tested. One of his main ideas was that states can win wars by attacking the enemy's centers of gravity. I argue that centers of gravity provide an important determinant of war outcomes, both by making military victory more likely and by providing a way through which information convergence is achieved.In this article, I test Clausewitz's claims regarding the importance of centers of gravity through a quantitative analysis of war outcomes from 1816 to 2007. I focus on three centers

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