Cell-based biosensor system using micropatterned polymer nanofiber

Lee, Hyun Jong; Jang, Eunji; Park, Saemi; Murthy, Pushpa S.; Koh, Won‐Gun

doi:10.1109/inec.2010.5424508

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…After all, how could neural activity be identical with consciousness given that the two appear so different? For this reason, neuroscientists search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), which has been defined as the minimal set of neural processes that are together sufficient for a specific conscious experience (Crick and Koch, 1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness as a Concrete Physical Phenomenon

Jylkkä

Railo

2019

Preprint

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The typical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%