CCP resolution, loss allocation and shareholders’ rights

Abstract

Purpose Central clearing counterparties’ (CCPs) specific loss allocation mechanism is reflected in the specific resolution regime designed at the international level. At the same time, international guidance texts require equity to bear losses first in resolution. This creates a tension that immediately exposes resolution authorities to potential claims from CCPs’ shareholders. The purpose of this paper is to seek possible options to solve that tension, thereby enabling a workable and credible resolution regime for CCPs. Design/methodology/approach The paper analyses the current tension between the no creditor worse-off (NCWO) counterfactual for CCPs and the “equity bears first losses in resolution” principle. It then considers six different options to solve this tension, ranging from a revision of insolvency law to the modification of the loss-allocation structure. Findings The paper concludes that additional layers of capital contribution, adapting the contractual arrangements or articles of incorporation and/or the creation of a specific NCWO counterfactual for shareholders could help in solving the identified tension. Practical implications The paper presents options on how to design a workable and credible resolution regime for CCPs that would enable resolution authorities to exercise their powers and have the flexibility to intervene at an early stage in recovery to prevent the exhaustion of available financial resources, without being unduly exposed to claims. Originality/value The paper contributes to the literature on CCP resolution. It is one of the first to analyse the articulation between the loss-allocation structure of CCPs, the NCWO principle and shareholders’ rights. We hope that this paper will encourage further literature to develop on this important subject.