Causes and consequences of the rise of populist radical right parties and movements in Europe

Abstract

This article reviews three strands in the scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR). It covers both political parties and extra-parliamentary mobilization in contemporary European democracies. After definitional issues and case selection, the authors first discuss demand-side approaches to the fortunes of the PRR. Subsequently, supply-side approaches are assessed, namely political opportunity explanations and internal supply-side factors, referring to leadership, organization and ideological positioning. Third, research on the consequences of the emergence and rise of these parties and movements is examined: do they constitute a corrective or a threat to democracy? The authors discuss the growing literature on the impact on established parties’ policies, the policies themselves, and citizens’ behaviour. The review concludes with future directions for theorizing and research.

Liberal Illiberalism? The Reshaping of the Contemporary Populist Radical Right in Northern Europe

“…While this article has already noted how the PRR's selective use of liberalism has brought them closer-at least in rhetoric-to their mainstream brethren, there is a perhaps another trend at play here coming from the opposite direction: the fact that the mainstream is also looking more like the populist right. There is a reason that it has become easier for PRR parties to cherry-pick liberal discourse and policies from their mainstream competitors: because many mainstream parties themselves have reconfigured liberal values and discourse in similar ways in Western and Northern Europe (see Bale, 2003;Mudde, 2013;Muis & Immerzeel, 2017;van Spanje, 2010). To only draw on a few examples-when mainstream parties in France pass a ban on religious attire; when mandatory integration classes are introduced in a number of 'progressive' countries; when Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte tells immigrants to 'integrate or leave'; and when putative liberal and Christian democrats are happy to keep avowed advocates of illiberalism like Viktor Orbán's Fidesz in their European People's Party group in the EU Parliamentone should perhaps see PRR parties' adoption of liberalism not as an exception, but as a clear repercussion of the increasing bankruptcy of the way that many mainstream actors use liberalism themselves.…”

Who's Welcome and Who's Not? Opposition towards Immigration in the Nordic Countries, 2002–2014

“…Group threat theory predicts that a hostile political climate will induce feelings of threat, and thereby influence attitudes towards immigrants (Blumer 1958;Hopkins 2010). While RRPs have been found to impact policy positions of other political parties (Minkenberg 2001;Bolin et al 2014;Careja et al 2016), previous studies provide mixed results in relation to the degree of negative immigrant attitudes (Muis & Immerzeel 2017). While some find significant effects of RRP presence (Semyonov et al 2006; Sprague-Jones 2011), others do not (Dunn & Singh 2011;Bohman & Hjerm 2016), which can be related to how RRPs generally lack legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public (cf.…”

The relationship between different social expenditure schemes and poverty, inequality and economic growth

“…In the light of the work of Piketty (2014), and given further impetus by the rise of populist movements (Muis and Immerzeel, 2017), there has been a resurgence in the public and academic debate on income and wealth inequality (Connor et al, 2019). Previously, many policy‐makers and academics assumed a trade‐off between reducing income inequality and increasing GDP growth (Okun, 1975; Benabou, 2000; Arjona et al, 2003).…”