Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences

Raatikainen, Panu

doi:10.1007/s10670-010-9236-0

Cited by 75 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…In particular, interventionism has been applied in discussions about the causal exclusion arguments advanced by Kim (see Woodward, 2008b;Raatikainen, 2010). Such a metaphysical reading raises worries for philosophers interested in the metaphysics of causation.…”

Section: Weaken or Reject The Interventionist Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms

Romero

2015

Synthese

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The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between (1) Woodward's popular interventionist theory of causation, (2) Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for (3) the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem.

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Section: Weaken or Reject The Interventionist Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms

Romero

2015

Synthese

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“…Robb 1997;Ehring 1999;Macdonald and Macdonald 1986;Gibb 2004) or on the causal relation (e.g. Loewer 2007;Menzies 2008;Raatikainen 2010).…”

Section: Rejecting the Principle Of Additional Causal Powersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overdetermination and Elimination

Árnadóttir

2015

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimi- nation of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at the same time. One problem for both arguments is that weak overdetermination isn’t obviously objectionable. That point has been well made before. But I want here to go further than merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination arguments. I want to tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist weak overdetermination and explain why their conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their case on the same motivating principle, which I call the principle of additional causal powers. This principle, I argue further, should be rejected. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against those at whom the arguments are directed

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“…The underlying physical state here is thus not a difference-making cause (cf. Raatikainen 2010Raatikainen , 2013Menzies 2008, List & Menzies 2009). Further, the causal role of the realized mental state apparently cannot be a priori 20 deduced from the causal role of the underlying physical realizer P 1 (whatever it is).…”

Section: A Priori Entailmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%