Causal Uncertainty: Factor Structure and Relation to the Big Five Personality Factors

Edwards, John A.; Weary, Gifford; Reich, Darcy A.

doi:10.1177/0146167298245001

Cited by 33 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…In the 2-factor model, the CU items loaded on a single CU factor. In the 3-factor model, the CU items loaded on two factors (own and other outcomes) that were positively correlated, r = .57, replicating the patterns reported by Edwards et al (1998).…”

Section: Pilot Studysupporting

confidence: 55%

“…Prior factor analyses of the CUS have revealed that it consists of two highly correlated factors: CU about one's own and other people's outcomes (Edwards, Weary, & Reich, 1998). We wanted to see if the CI items would form a third distinct factor.…”

Section: Pilot Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, we specified a 3-factor model, with the six CI items loading on a CI factor and the nine CU-own items (items 1-5, 7-9, 13) and 5 CU-other items (6, 10-12, 14) loading on separate CU factors (as in Edwards et al, 1998). The RMSEA indicated that this model fit the data reasonably well (RMSEA = .062).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effects of Causal Uncertainty, Causal Importance, and Initial Attitude on Attention to Causal Persuasive Arguments

Tobin¹,

Weary²

2008

Social Cognition

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In two studies, we examined how individual differences in causal uncertainty (CU), causal importance (CI), and initial attitudes affected the processing of a persuasive message that contained causal or non-causal arguments. We predicted that high CU individuals' doubts about their causal understanding of events would be activated when they were presented with counterattitudinal arguments. When these individuals also placed a high value on causal understanding (high CI), they should scrutinize any available causal explanations. As a result, they should be more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In support of these predictions, we found in two studies that high CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong compared to weak counterattitudinal causal arguments. Mediational analyses in Study 2 revealed that high CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong causal arguments because they were more confident in them. Implications for the CU model and persuasion processes are discussed.Social psychologists long have been interested in how people understand the causes of events in the social world. Early attribution theorists argued that in order to predict and control their social environments, people attribute behavior and events to stable, underlying causes (Heider, 1958). This early work and subsequent research has provided us with a wealth of information about attribution processes (for a review see Gilbert, 1998) and the critical role they play in many different domains. 44Social Cognition, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2008, pp. 44-65 Stephanie J. Tobin, Department of Psychology, University of Houston; Gifford Weary, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University.This article is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted by Stephanie Tobin to the Ohio State University. We would like to thank committee members Russell Fazio and Richard Petty for their valuable feedback on this research. We also would like to thank members of the 2002-2004 Group for Attitudes and Persuasion and the Weary Lab for their comments on this research and Pablo Briñol and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. A partial report of the data was presented at the 2004 Society for Personality and Social Psychology meeting.

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Section: Pilot Studysupporting

confidence: 55%

Section: Pilot Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effects of Causal Uncertainty, Causal Importance, and Initial Attitude on Attention to Causal Persuasive Arguments

Tobin¹,

Weary²

2008

Social Cognition

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“…Sample items from the scale include: "When I receive poor grades, I usually do not understand why I did so poorly"; "When I see something good happen to others, I often do not know why it happened"; and "I often feel like I do not have enough information to come to a conclusion about why things happen to me." The scale has been shown to have high internal consistency (Cronbach's a = .83) and a 6-week test-retest reliability from .62 to .80 (see Reich, 1998, andEdwards, 1994, for reviews of the psychometric and construct validation evidence for this scale).The mean CUS score in the current study was 38.87 (SD = 10.28). To determine whether participants in the two stereotype conditions differed in terms of their level of causal uncertainty, their CUS scores were regressed on the stereotype information condition variable (effects coded so that the stereotype condition = 1 and the no-stereotype condition = -1).…”

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confidence: 60%

Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage.

Weary¹,

Jacobson²,

Edwards³

et al. 2001

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage.Within the past decade, there has been an explosion of renewed interest in goals and their effects on cognition, affect, and behavior (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996;Higgins & Sorrentino, 1990;Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986. Although much of this work focused on specific goal contents and their affective and behavioral sequelae, a major interest of contemporary theorists and researchers has been the various cognitive processes involved in goal-directed action. Individuals (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990;Weary & Edwards, 1996) working within this more recent tradition generally have viewed goals as cognitive representations of desired end states, and they have focused their attention on the cognitive processes and strategies used in the pursuit of goal attainment and/or disengagement.In addition to this focus on the cognitive bases of motivation and goal pursuit, several investigators (e.g., Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Gifford Weary, Jill A. Jacobson, and Stephanie J. Tobin, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University; John A. Edwards, Department of Psychology, Oregon State University.Jill A. Jacobson is now at the Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine.This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Research Grant SBR-970954I and by National Institute of Mental Health Training Grant T32-MH19728. Study 2 was conducted in connection with Jill A. Jacobson's dissertation research. Partial reports of the data for Study 2 were presented at the 1999 American Psychological Society meeting in Denver, CO. We thank Galen Bodenhausen for sharing his experimental materials with us.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gifford Weary, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, 1885 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210. Electronic mail may be sent to weary.l@osu.edu. Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) have begun to focus on the possible implicit, or automatic, activation of goal-relevant cognitive structures. Thes...

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“…Belirsizliğin özel bir durumunu inceleyen nedensel belirsizlik kuramı (Causal Uncertainty Theory) (Weary ve Edwards, 1994, 1996 kişilerin neden sonuç ilişkisini atfedebilme becerisinden şüphe etmesi ile ilgilenmektedir. Çalışmaların sonuçlarına göre nedensel belirsizlik ile olumsuz duygu durumu (Tobin ve Raymundo, 2010), depresyon (Weary ve Edwards, 1994;1996), nörotiklik (Edwards, Weary ve Reich, 1998) ve onay arama ihtiyacı (Jacobson ve Weary, 1999;Jacobson, 2007) (Hogg, 2009;Hogg ve Abrams, 1993). Gruplar kişiye hem kendini ve iç grup üyelerini tanımlaması hem de kendini dış grup üyelerinden ayrıştırması için fırsat sunar (Hogg, 2009).…”

Section: Belirsizliğin Etkileri Nelerdir?unclassified

Psychological Effects of Uncertainty

Küçükkömürler¹

2017

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Causal Uncertainty: Factor Structure and Relation to the Big Five Personality Factors

Cited by 33 publications

References 51 publications

The Effects of Causal Uncertainty, Causal Importance, and Initial Attitude on Attention to Causal Persuasive Arguments

The Effects of Causal Uncertainty, Causal Importance, and Initial Attitude on Attention to Causal Persuasive Arguments

Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage.

Psychological Effects of Uncertainty

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