Causal Theories of Threat and Success – Simple Analytical Tools Making it Easier to Assess, Formulate, and Validate Military Strategy

Abstract

The common assumptions-ends-ways-means-risk (AEWMR) military strategy model instructs its users to make reasonable assumptions, balance ends, ways and means, and control for risks. But it does not offer much practical guidance on how this should be done, or how to choose between relevant balanced strategies. To address this problem, recent scholarship has proposed the concept of theory of success as an analytical tool to enhance the ability of strategists to assess, formulate, and validate military strategies. This article seeks to take this body of scholarship to the next level by operationalizing the theory of success concept into a simple easy-to-use practical guide that helps its users to identify the assumptions and causal hypotheses underpinning any military strategy, and to validate it logically and empirically. The article is based on the assumption that greater analytical clarity and rigour is a prerequisite for better military strategy. It expects conceptually clear, logically consistent and empirically validated military strategies to stand a better chance of success than vague, inconsistent, and poorly validated ones. Use of the analytical tool proposed here will of course not guarantee successful outcomes. Politics, biases and flawed intelligence may still result in the adoption of flawed assumptions and formulation of ill-suited strategies. Military strategy from may also continue to fail in the execution phase as a result of clever enemy responses and unforeseen developments.

Introduction: Military Strategy: What is the Use of It?

“…It was a reaction to an external strategic shock: Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its use of force in eastern Ukraine in 2014. NATO consequently formulated a new end, deterrence of a conventional military Russian attack on the Baltic countries and Poland, and selected a way (deterrence by punishment in the form of a tripwire force) and the means (5,000 personnel) deemed likely to achieve it with acceptable costs and risks (Jakobsen, 2022).…”

Small State Strategy in Practice: The Formulation and Execution of Danish Theories of Success in the United Nations Security Council, 2005–2006

“…Consequently, the examination of the development of the Danish theory of success must ask questions that translate into the realities of Danish decision-making. The first section of the analysis thus asks three questions concerning the general strategy, inspired by the framework given in this issue by Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2022). This section is based on the understanding that the membership period is an opportunity for influence, and thus asks, first, what opportunities for influence did Danish decision-makers identify in the strategic environment of the UNSC?…”

“…Based on previously unpublished diplomatic records, this article aims to provide the first detailed account of how Denmark developed a general strategy designed to gain influence in the UNSC and broke down the general strategy into specific strategies to handle particular international security issues between 2005 and 2006, when the country held a seat in the UNSC. More, the article adds empirical evidence to the strand of strategic studies positing that strategy is mainly a question of building a theory of success to explain how and why a range of actions will lead to goal attainment (Hill & Gerras, 2018;Jakobsen, 2022;Hoffman, 2020;Meiser, 2016;Meiser & Nath, 2018;Meiser & Quirk, 2020). The article uses the concept of the theory of success as a heuristic lens to analyse the preparation taken by Danish diplomats for the membership period and how those ideas were adapted to specific circumstances of P5 resistance requiring a bespoke theory.…”