Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions

Lombrozo, Tania

doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002

Cited by 219 publications

(323 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…Because discussions of teleological reasoning [23,[40][41][42] have not yet engaged this relational dimension, the conceptual distinctions articulated here are new (Table 1). To begin, notice that 'promiscuous' teleological functions are inherently relational: they engage reasoning about at least two entities (e.g., animal, rainclouds).…”

Section: Are Clouds 'For' Raining?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Teleological reasoning about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives?

Ojalehto

Waxman

Medin

2013

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

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Section: Are Clouds 'For' Raining?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Teleological reasoning about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives?

Ojalehto

Waxman

Medin

2013

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

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“…We focus here on an aspect of the relationship between counterfactuals and causation that has been referred to as sensitivity (or robustness) of causation (Hitchcock, 2012;Knobe & Szabó, 2013;Lombrozo, 2010;Woodward, 2006).…”

Section: Running Head: Causal Supersedingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal superseding

et al. 2015

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When agents violate norms, they are typically judged to be more of a cause of resulting outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that norm violations also affect the causality attributed to other agents, a phenomenon we refer to as "causal superseding." We propose and test a counterfactual reasoning model of this phenomenon in four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 provide an initial demonstration of the causal superseding effect and distinguish it from previously studied effects. Experiment 3 shows that this causal superseding effect is dependent on a particular event structure, following a prediction of our counterfactual model. Experiment 4 demonstrates that causal superseding can occur with violation of non-moral norms. We propose a model of the superseding effect based on the idea of counterfactual sufficiency.

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“…Dual to necessity, a number of researchers have proposed that judgments of actual causation also involve a notion of robust sufficiency (Hitchcock, 2012;Lombrozo, 2010;Woodward, 2006):…”

Section: Counterfactual Analysis Of Actual Causementioning

confidence: 99%

Normality and actual causal strength

2017

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Existing research suggests that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure of actual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed in existing studies. More importantly, the measure predicts a new effect ("abnormal deflation"). Two studies show that people's judgments do, in fact, show this new effect. Taken together, the patterns of people's causal judgments thereby provide support for the proposed explanation.

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Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions

Cited by 219 publications

References 64 publications

Teleological reasoning about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives?

Teleological reasoning about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives?

Causal superseding

Normality and actual causal strength

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