Causal Cognition in Human and Nonhuman Animals: A Comparative, Critical Review

Penn, Derek C.; Povinelli, Daniel J.

doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085555

Cited by 257 publications

(259 citation statements)

References 102 publications

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“…Analogous reasoning is regarded as a core faculty of human cognition [1], and necessary for complex abstract causal reasoning [2]. In biology, analogy is sometimes considered to be the poor cousin of homology -similar, but not really the same.…”

Section: Learning and Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Can Evolution Learn?

Watson

Szathmary

2016

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

202

216

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The theory of evolution links random variation and selection to incremental adaptation. In a different intellectual domain, learning theory links incremental adaptation (e.g., from positive and/or negative reinforcement) to intelligent behaviour. Specifically, learning theory explains how incremental adaptation can acquire knowledge from past experience and use it to direct future behaviours toward favourable outcomes. Until recently such cognitive learning seemed irrelevant to the 'uninformed' process of evolution. In our opinion, however, new results formally linking evolutionary processes to the principles of learning might provide solutions to several evolutionary puzzles -the evolution of evolvability, the evolution of ecological organisation, and evolutionary transitions in individuality. If so, the ability for evolution to learn might explain how it produces such apparently intelligent designs. Learning and EvolutionNew insights and new ways of understanding are often provided by analogies. Analogous reasoning is regarded as a core faculty of human cognition [1], and necessary for complex abstract causal reasoning [2]. In biology, analogy is sometimes considered to be the poor cousin of homology -similar, but not really the same. But in science more generally, analogies can be founded on perfect equivalences, for example, mathematical isomorphisms or algorithmic equivalence, thus enabling the transfer of ready-made results from one system or discipline to another, for example, between quasispecies theory and population genetics [3,4], electromagnetic fields and hydrodynamics [5], and magnetism and neural networks [6]. The previously casual analogy between learning systems and evolution by natural selection has recently been deepened to a level where such transfer can begin.How Intelligent is Evolution? Evolution is sometimes likened to an active problem solver, seeking out ingenious solutions to difficult environmental challenges. The solutions discovered by evolution can certainly appear ingenious. Mechanistically, however, there appear to be good reasons to doubt that cognitive problem solving and evolution are equivalent in any real sense. For example, cognitive problem solving can utilise past knowledge about a problem domain to 'anticipate' future outcomes and direct exploration of solutions, whereas evolutionary exploration is myopic and dependent on undirected variation. Intelligent problem solvers can also form high-level or modular representations of a problem, making it easier to reuse partial solutions in new contexts, whereas evolution merely plods on, filtering random replication errors.Yet, this is not the whole story. Whilst genetic variation might be undirected, the pattern of phenotypic variation is shaped and biased by the processes of development. Moreover, the organisation of developmental processes (from gene regulatory interactions to morphological body plans) is itself, in large part, a product of past evolution. This affords the possibility that random genetic changes might produce...

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Section: Learning and Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Can Evolution Learn?

Watson

Szathmary

2016

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

202

216

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“…(b) Tool use Many animals are now known to use tools [49,59], but their behaviour generally reflects little or no understanding of physical principles [60]. Most evidence for this conclusion comes from laboratory studies in which primates and tool-using birds are tested for their ability to transfer successful tool use to conceptually related but perceptually altered tasks.…”

Section: Review Human Uniqueness S J Shettleworth 2797mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modularity, comparative cognition and human uniqueness

Shettleworth

2012

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Darwin's claim 'that the difference in mind between man and the higher animals . . . is certainly one of degree and not of kind' is at the core of the comparative study of cognition. Recent research provides unprecedented support for Darwin's claim as well as new reasons to question it, stimulating new theories of human cognitive uniqueness. This article compares and evaluates approaches to such theories. Some prominent theories propose sweeping domain-general characterizations of the difference in cognitive capabilities and/or mechanisms between adult humans and other animals. Dual-process theories for some cognitive domains propose that adult human cognition shares simple basic processes with that of other animals while additionally including slowerdeveloping and more explicit uniquely human processes. These theories are consistent with a modular account of cognition and the 'core knowledge' account of children's cognitive development. A complementary proposal is that human infants have unique social and/or cognitive adaptations for uniquely human learning. A view of human cognitive architecture as a mosaic of unique and species-general modular and domain-general processes together with a focus on uniquely human developmental mechanisms is consistent with modern evolutionary-developmental biology and suggests new questions for comparative research.

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“…Sensitivity to functionally-relevant features of tools has also been demonstrated by a series of experiments by Marc Hauser and colleagues, primarily with non-tool-using cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus; Hauser, 997;Hauser, Kralik, & Botto-Mahan, 999;Hauser, Pearson, & Seelig, 2002;Hauser, Santos, Spaepen, & Pearson, 2002;Santos, Rosati, Sproul, Spaulding, & Hauser, 2005), but also by testing rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta; Santos, Miller, & Hauser, 2003), common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus; , and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops; Santos, Pearson, Spaepen, Tsao, & Hauser, 2006). However, these results suggest that the subjects possess domain-specific biases regarding what features of objects are relevant in certain situations, rather than an understanding of underlying causality (Penn & Povinelli, 2007). Indeed, in recent experiments Santos and colleagues have tested tamarins on experiments similar to those used by Povinelli and colleagues with chimpanzees (Povinelli, 2000) and apparently found that like chimpanzees, the tamarins failed to distinguish between the functional and non-functional tools or actions (reviewed by Hauser & Santos, in press).…”

Section: The Trap-tube Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, this debate has been hampered by a lack of precision in the specification of what is meant by reasoning or inferring: As Penn and Povinelli (2007) point out, the advocates for such processes tend to formulate their arguments verbally, rather than mathematically, which makes them almost impossible to refute. Some authors do explicitly define higher-order reasoning-for example, as "processes [that] can be characterized as reflective […], rule-based […], and deliberate […] and [which] operate on conscious propositional knowledge in a controlled (i.e., slow, effortful, conscious, and/or intentional) manner" (de Houwer, Beckers, & Vandorpe, 2005, p. 240).…”

Section: Figure 2 New Caledonian Crows Make and Use A Range Of Tool mentioning

confidence: 99%

Tool-Related Cognition in New Caledonian Crows

Bluff

Weir

Rutz

et al. 2006

ccbr

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The extent to which non-humans understand their physical world is controversial, due to conceptual and empirical difficulties. We examine the evidence for physical understanding in the remarkable tool-oriented behaviour of New Caledonian crows, which make several types of tool in the wild and show prolific tool-related behaviour in captivity. We summarize our own research into the cognitive processes involved in tool behaviour in this species, and review comparable studies in other birds and primates. Our main laboratory findings are: tool-related behaviour emerges in juvenile crows that had no opportunity to learn from others; adult crows can make or select tools of the appropriate length or diameter for tasks; and one crow, at least, can bend and unbend novel material to match task requirements. Although these observations are striking, they do not prove that this species is capable of understanding physical causality, as one cannot exclude explanations based on inherited proclivities, associative learning, and generalisation. Despite this, we argue that the conventional mechanisms become less likely as such observations accumulate. We conclude that while no adequate, non-verbal test for understanding exists, continued work with New Caledonian crows will help us to ask the right questions.

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Causal Cognition in Human and Nonhuman Animals: A Comparative, Critical Review

Cited by 257 publications

References 102 publications

How Can Evolution Learn?

How Can Evolution Learn?

Modularity, comparative cognition and human uniqueness

Tool-Related Cognition in New Caledonian Crows

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