2000
DOI: 10.1136/jme.26.4.237
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Causal authorship and the equality principle: a defence of the acts/omissions distinction in euthanasia

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Cited by 14 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 9 publications
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“…1,20 Within the context of a public information day, Gallagher 21 found that almost half of people thought that treatment withdrawal was euthanasia and an Oregon study revealed much confusion in patients about their end-of-life options. 15 For some, [22][23][24][25] such confusion may be understandable because they believe that there is no moral distinction between acts or omissions that result in death. They contend that "passive" and "active" euthanasia are morally equivalent.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1,20 Within the context of a public information day, Gallagher 21 found that almost half of people thought that treatment withdrawal was euthanasia and an Oregon study revealed much confusion in patients about their end-of-life options. 15 For some, [22][23][24][25] such confusion may be understandable because they believe that there is no moral distinction between acts or omissions that result in death. They contend that "passive" and "active" euthanasia are morally equivalent.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But Causation Accounts unpack this difference in terms of the different roles played by killing and allowing to die in causal explanations. Accordingly, when I kill someone, I must be understood as causing their death, but when I merely allow someone to die, it is not appropriate to describe myself as having caused their death (24,25). 17 More specifically, in killing a patient by administering a lethal injection, a doctor assumes (causal) responsibility for the patient's death, but it would be incorrect to describe a doctor's merely allowing their patient to die (by WLT) as causally responsible for the death, since it is the underlying medical condition that (proximately) causes death (25)(26)(27).…”
Section: The Causation Accountmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Accordingly, when I kill someone, I must be understood as causing their death, but when I merely allow someone to die, it is not appropriate to describe myself as having caused their death (24,25). 17 More specifically, in killing a patient by administering a lethal injection, a doctor assumes (causal) responsibility for the patient's death, but it would be incorrect to describe a doctor's merely allowing their patient to die (by WLT) as causally responsible for the death, since it is the underlying medical condition that (proximately) causes death (25)(26)(27). 18 Stauch (25), for instance, argues for a necessary link between an act (commission) and causal authorship for its outcome which is not present in omissions that bring about the same outcome when no socially imposed duty to act obtains.…”
Section: The Causation Accountmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a general means of assisting analysts in their studies of different practices, a taxonomy that distinguishes active and passive euthanasia can be useful, principally as we can not usefully argue about these matters unless we are clear about what our arguments touch upon 2. Although it seems to have become received wisdom from ethicists of quite conflicting views that moral propriety can not hang merely on whether a situation obtains because of (inter alia) an agent’s action or inaction, there continue to be defences of the act/omission distinction 3 4. In his paper,1 McLachlan has attempted to add support to those who argue that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is a moral one.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%