Causal attributions and the trolley problem

Abstract

In this paper, we consider two competing explanations of the empirical finding that people's causal attributions are responsive to normative details, such as whether an agent's action violated an injunctive norm-the counterfactual view and the responsibility view. We then present experimental evidence that uses the trolley dilemma in a new way to investigate causal attribution. In the switch version of the trolley problem, people judge that the agent ought to flip the switch, but they also judge that she is more responsible for the resulting outcome when she does so than when she refrains. As predicted by the responsibility view, but not the counterfactual view, people are more likely to say that the agent caused the outcome when she flips the switch.

Experimental Metaphysics: Causation

“…Consistent with previous work, people agreed more with the causal statement in the action case than with the causal statement in the inaction case (Sytsma and Livengood 2021).…”

“…One view is an extension of the responsibility account discussed in Section 2.1.1 (Sytsma 2021b). When investigating abnormal inflation, Sytsma and Livengood (2021) found what seems to be a case of the action effect. In one experiment, they gave some participants a version of a trolley problem where the agent performs an action (Sytsma and Livengood 2021):…”

“…Another prominent explanation for abnormal inflation is the responsibility account (Sytsma 2021b). On this view, normative evaluations-like responsibility judgments-are part of what someone considers when they make a causal judgment; so, causal statements-like "X caused Y"-are similar to judgments of responsibility-like "X is responsible for Y" (Sytsma 2021b, 2021a, Sytsma and Livengood 2021. As such, when people, for instance, judge that Professor Smith caused the receptionist's problem, they express in part that the agent is responsible for that outcome (Sytsma 2021a).…”

Inference from explanation.

“…According to this account, emphasizing the causal contribution of an abnormal cause allows people to validate their spontaneous blame response. Others argue that people’s ordinary concept of causation is itself normative, with causal judgments being akin to judgments about responsibility (Sytsma, 2019; Sytsma & Livengood, 2019; Sytsma et al, 2012). Samland and Waldmann (2016) contend that these effects arise due to pragmatic factors in the context of norm violations and human agents.…”

“…People select abnormal causes for abnormal effects, and normal causes for normal effects. Another group of accounts argues that norms affect causal judgments by influencing how blameworthy or responsible an action was (Alicke, 2000; Alicke & Rose, 2012; Samland & Waldmann, 2016; Sytsma & Livengood, 2019). People select causes that are more deserving of blame.…”