Catastrophe Ethics and Activist Speech: Reflections on Moral Norms, Advocacy, and Technical Judgment

Abstract

This essay critically examines whether there are ethical dimensions to the way that expertise, knowledge claims, and expressions of skepticism intersect on technical matters that influence public policy, especially during times of crisis. It compares two different perspectives on the matter: a philosophical outlook rooted in discourse and virtue ethics and a sociological outlook rooted in the socalled third-wave approach to science studies. The comparison occurs through metaphilosophical analysis and applied claims that clarify how the disciplinary orientations appear to lead to different judgments about matters related to Robert Paarlberg's condemnation of activists who advise African politicians to ban genetically modified food.

The Legitimacy of Pseudo‐Expert Discourse in the Public Sphere

“…Many codes of professional conduct require that practitioners show respect for the parties they advise. Typically codes of professional conduct impose the following obligations on professionals: to not distort the facts to make a cause seem more persuasive than it actually is, and to carefully consider the implications that are likely to follow if people actually accept your position (Selinger, Thompson, and Collins , 120). Professionals who offer expert advice are morally and legally bound in various ways.…”

“…People should be free to hold any manner of beliefs and opinions, even if they are wrong or misguided, and they should be free to express themselves as they please in various deliberative forums. Because their views are not technical views, they should not be taken seriously to begin with (Selinger, Thompson, and Collins , 118). The obligations and potential penalties are relevant only in the case where the speakers are either experts or what I will refer to as “phoney” experts—that is, speakers who attempt to use the tropes of expertise to manufacture legitimacy for their views, such that they appear to have technical knowledge even though they actually do not.…”

“…My argument does not entail that so‐called maverick scientists and thinkers should be held liable for radical views or that we should be intolerant of dissent in scientific and academic debate. So long as dissenting views in technical discussions are supported with good evidence and that media representations of those views are clear that the views do not represent the consensus of views about a particular issue, they should not present a problem for this argument (Selinger, Thompson, and Collins , 118). Experts or phoney experts should not, however, engage in misleading or deceptive conduct in order to make their claims seem more legitimate than they otherwise would be.…”

“… Collins and Weinel ; Axel ; Goodwin ; Majdik and William ; Quirk ; Rehg ; Selinger ; Selinger, Thompson, and Collins .…”

Six Questions About Translational Due Diligence

“…For example, philosophical discussions of technology transfer have shown how diffi cult it can be to anticipate the cultural barriers that may prevent one group of people (such as people in developing countries) from adopting or optimally using technologies that other groups of people (such as people in developed nations) have put to seemingly good use (8). Likewise, philosophical discussions of the reasons why African countries reject genetically modifi ed foods, despite leaders of these nations receiving assurances from Western scientifi c experts that the food is safe, illuminate why diff erent perceptions of risk exist and why technical risk assessment can play only a minor role in personal and policy decisions related to health (9).…”