Casualties and Public Support for Military Conflict with North Korea

Rich, Timothy S.

doi:10.1017/s1049096518000999

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…We therefore opted not to provide casualty estimates or probabilities of success, including potential US military losses that would result from a ground invasion of North Korea. This could artificially induce casualty sensitivity, as the public rarely considers such casualties unless primed (Rich 2019). Additionally, pre-war predictions of casualties are highly variable.…”

Section: Simulating a Nuclear Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Allison

Herzog

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

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Section: Simulating a Nuclear Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Allison

Herzog

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Third, unlike Russia or China, it is realistic to claim that North Korean WMD capabilities were successfully destroyed in the first strike, and we can, therefore, bracket the potential concerns of our participants about nuclear or chemical retaliation. Other recent survey experiments that examined the public support for the use of military force vis-à-vis North Korea are Haworth, Sagan, and Valentino (2019), Rich (2019), Sukin (2020), and Allison, Herzog, and Ko (2022). 7.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The lesser evil? Experimental evidence on the strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos”

Smetana

Vranka

Rosendorf

2022

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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We present findings of a survey experiment on a sample of 2350 American and British citizens, in which we examined attitudes towards nuclear and chemical strikes. Our findings demonstrate that even though the public accurately judges nuclear weapons as more destructive and indiscriminate, it is still more averse to the use of chemical than nuclear weapons. Our follow up study has shown that individuals are significantly more likely to associate chemical weapons with “rogue states” and terrorists, and associate nuclear weapons with modern powers. The findings contribute to scholarship on the “taboos” surrounding the (non-)use of WMDs in world politics.

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“…12 Limited examples on perceptions of North Korea show the influence of framing and priming. For example, the mentioning of potential South and North Korean casualties in a military conflict with North Korea decreased American public support for military action, 13 while South Korean support for a joint Korean Olympic bid declines by 18 percent when the potential cost of building North Korean infrastructure is mentioned. 14 According to the existing literature, we should expect that word choice should influence perceptions of unification, although it remains unclear to what extent.…”

Section: Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%