Cascading attacks against smart grid using control command disaggregation and services

Min, Byungho; Varadharajan, Vijay

doi:10.1145/2851613.2853128

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Because of large scale and complex transaction, a typical hierarchical communication system is used in many large-scale CPSs [20][21][22], including many sub-controllers. Figure 3 shows the structure of communication system [23].…”

Section: Data Transmission In the Communication Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The commands from the controller are disaggregated by the sub-controllers in every layer and are transferred to the next-tier sub-controllers. Min, B. et al [20] describes an example about the power grid: assuming that the demand response (DR) load reduction of 70 MW is requested across the entire grid. Because DR capacities available on the subsystems are not equal due to their original capacity and the current state, this global command has to be disaggregated into a set of lower-level commands.…”

Section: Data Transmission In the Communication Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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False Sequential Command Attack of Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems

Xiong

Yang²,

Wang

et al. 2018

Electronics

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Previous studies have demonstrated that false commands can cause severe damage to large-scale cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We focus on a kind of threat called false sequential command attack, with which attackers can generate false sequential commands, resulting in the illegal control of the physical process. We present a feasible attack model. Attackers delay the disaggregation of former commands by manipulating maliciously sub-controllers. Simultaneously, bad feedback data is injected to defeat the controller to issue latter commands. Thus, false command sequence is executed and the disruption of physical process can be obtained. It is also difficult for the detector to identify such attacks as injecting bad data. We also discuss other possible attack paths and analyze the corresponding disadvantages. Compared with other paths, the proposed model is more feasible and has more difficulties to be detected. A case study is given to validate the feasibility and effectiveness of proposed false sequential command attack model. Finally, we discuss the possible countermeasure.

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Section: Data Transmission In the Communication Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Data Transmission In the Communication Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

False Sequential Command Attack of Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems

Xiong

Yang²,

Wang

et al. 2018

Electronics

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“…Currently, there are some researches that have focused on command disaggregation attacks. For example, in [ 2 ], the authors demonstrated the possibility of command disaggregation attacks and revealed the cascading failure effect, but the process of command disaggregation attacks that can cause damage to physical system is not described.…”

Section: Related Work and Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A large-scale industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) [ 1 ] is deployed to help utilities such as smart train and smart grid provide better service. A typical hierarchical system is adopted in many large-scale IIoTs to obtain flexible control [ 2 , 3 , 4 ]; this system includes many lower-layer sub-controllers, such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in power systems. Sub-controllers are in charge of command disaggregation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Command Disaggregation Attack and Mitigation in Industrial Internet of Things

Xun

Zhu

et al. 2017

Sensors

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A cyber-physical attack in the industrial Internet of Things can cause severe damage to physical system. In this paper, we focus on the command disaggregation attack, wherein attackers modify disaggregated commands by intruding command aggregators like programmable logic controllers, and then maliciously manipulate the physical process. It is necessary to investigate these attacks, analyze their impact on the physical process, and seek effective detection mechanisms. We depict two different types of command disaggregation attack modes: (1) the command sequence is disordered and (2) disaggregated sub-commands are allocated to wrong actuators. We describe three attack models to implement these modes with going undetected by existing detection methods. A novel and effective framework is provided to detect command disaggregation attacks. The framework utilizes the correlations among two-tier command sequences, including commands from the output of central controller and sub-commands from the input of actuators, to detect attacks before disruptions occur. We have designed components of the framework and explain how to mine and use these correlations to detect attacks. We present two case studies to validate different levels of impact from various attack models and the effectiveness of the detection framework. Finally, we discuss how to enhance the detection framework.

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Bespoke Weighting Schema and Sequence of Transformations for Enhanced Insight into Prospective False Command Injection Attacks

Chan¹,

Nopphawan²

2023

2023 International Conference on Cyber Management and Engineering (CyMaEn)

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Cascading attacks against smart grid using control command disaggregation and services

Cited by 6 publications

References 19 publications

False Sequential Command Attack of Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems

False Sequential Command Attack of Large-Scale Cyber-Physical Systems

Command Disaggregation Attack and Mitigation in Industrial Internet of Things

Bespoke Weighting Schema and Sequence of Transformations for Enhanced Insight into Prospective False Command Injection Attacks

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