Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign Against 'Harmful Tax Competition'

Morriss, Andrew P.; Moberg, Lotta

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1950627

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…17 This is because of inevitable differences in tax rules, where States, naturally, have different tax laws in terms of tax bases, tax rates, deductions, etc. 18 In other words, it becomes possible for the States to compete against each other using available natural and unavoidable tax differences such as the statutory or effective tax rates. 19 The natural essence of tax competition is also overhauled by its long existence coupled with its probability of continuing to exist in the future.…”

Section: Ii2 Natural Charactermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…123 That is how tax competition then intensified among other competitions that States are consistently engaged in. 124 Furthermore, notwithstanding the discerning influence and the positive effects of globalisation on the development of tax systems, 127 globalisation intensified harmful tax practices and the negative effects thereto associated such as the fact that one country's tax system can potentially have or suffer the impact to or from others' tax systems. 128 In consequence, countries become unable to set tax rules in an absolute and unilateral way in an era of globalisation and tax competition.…”

Section: Impact Of Globalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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In Search of the Boundaries Between Harmless and Harmful Tax Competition

Habimana¹

2021

ALF

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This paper is based on the endless discussions over tax competition. While the discussions over harmless tax competition and harmful tax competition are not yet closed, one of the key issues that adds on is the distinctive boundaries between the two. That is the focus of this paper, which suggests that, with respect to State tax sovereignty, any tax competition done to attract genuine investment is harmless. Equally is a tax competition whose tools do not make a distinction between residents and non-residents. In contrast, tax competition with ring-fenced tools and tax competition that aims at poaching other countries' tax bases look prima facie harmful. Without claiming having exhaustively drawn the boundaries, this paper contributes to the discussions over the distinction between harmless and harmful tax competition by shedding the light on some elements distinguishing harmless from harmful tax competition.

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Section: Ii2 Natural Charactermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Impact Of Globalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Search of the Boundaries Between Harmless and Harmful Tax Competition

Habimana¹

2021

ALF

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“…Sharman (2012: 24-5), for instance, lays emphasis on the OECD staff's 'shared rationalising vocation, ordering, categorising and recording economic activity'. In particular, the liberal economic culture among the OECD bureaucrats has structured the organization's policy outputs (Morriss and Moberg 2012;Porter and Webb 2007), sometimes leading to a weak, though successfully diffused, "lowest common denominator" standard in the tax area (Eccleston and Woodward 2014).…”

Section: Linked Ecologies In Transnational (Tax) Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Elite professionals in transnational tax governance

Christensen

2020

Global Networks

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Since the global financial crisis, international corporate taxation has risen to the top of the global political agenda, as political leaders have called for collective action to shore up corporate tax systems. However, high‐level political initiative alone does not create new international corporate tax rules. Rather, these transnational governance processes are centrally driven by elite tax professionals competing for prestige and influence. In this article, I investigate this competition in the case of one crucial post‐crisis reform – the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project. I argue that hierarchies of prestige and influence for elite professionals in transnational tax governance are based on strategic combinations of career resources in issue‐specific ‘linked ecologies'. In particular, I detail the expertise and network positioning of elite professionals, and discuss how these resources were mobilized in competitions for professional authority, which in turn shaped the transnational policy process. Evidence is drawn from qualitative interviews and career analysis.

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“…Private zone development is not a guarantee that investors will in fact invest in the SEZs. Natural resources, stable environment, and good institutions are more important than low tariffs and taxes for a location's business attractiveness (Morriss and Moberg, 2012: pp 12, 57).…”

Section: Robust Political Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of special economic zones

Moberg

2014

Journal of Institutional Economics

Self Cite

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This paper is a first attempt to apply a robust political economy framework to explain when Special Economic Zones (SEZs) can contribute to economic development. A robust political economy is one that channels the actions of self-interested individuals with limited information to promote economic progress. In the right institutional context, SEZs tend to promote economic growth. In the wrong institutional context, they can cause resource misallocation and rent-seeking. Policy makers introducing SEZs must overcome the knowledge problem to avoid misdirected economic planning. Yet, the scheme can only fulfill its purpose if it also prevents destructive rent-seeking behavior, both from businesses and from government authorities. The political economy framework of SEZs can be applied to judge their potential efficacy, something that orthodox studies of country features such as natural resources, infrastructure, and zone location fail to do. The Indian and Chinese experiences with SEZs illustrate these points.

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Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign Against 'Harmful Tax Competition'

Abstract: Formed in 1961 to promote global economic and social well-being, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Cited by 16 publications

References 26 publications

In Search of the Boundaries Between Harmless and Harmful Tax Competition

In Search of the Boundaries Between Harmless and Harmful Tax Competition

Elite professionals in transnational tax governance

The political economy of special economic zones

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