Justice and Care 1995
DOI: 10.4324/9780429499463-16
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason [1995]

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
33
0

Year Published

2001
2001
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
5
4
1

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 76 publications
(34 citation statements)
references
References 1 publication
0
33
0
Order By: Relevance
“…While the domestic work of caring can to a certain extent be commodified and paid for, emotional care work involves a relationship that is substantively different. Lynch (1989) identified 'love labour' as emotional care work performed within intimate relationships, a labour that is other directed or heteronomous (Jaggar, 1995;Kittay & Feder, 2001), and an inalienable work, necessarily implicated in fostering the relationship per se. Lynch suggests that this type of care work is special because you cannot, for example, pay someone to have dinner with your partner 'as if it was you', or in this instance, to take decisions about your child's care and schooling, 'as if it was you' your presence is required for the relationship to work.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…While the domestic work of caring can to a certain extent be commodified and paid for, emotional care work involves a relationship that is substantively different. Lynch (1989) identified 'love labour' as emotional care work performed within intimate relationships, a labour that is other directed or heteronomous (Jaggar, 1995;Kittay & Feder, 2001), and an inalienable work, necessarily implicated in fostering the relationship per se. Lynch suggests that this type of care work is special because you cannot, for example, pay someone to have dinner with your partner 'as if it was you', or in this instance, to take decisions about your child's care and schooling, 'as if it was you' your presence is required for the relationship to work.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…What arises from this second vision of cosmopolitanism is an awareness of the importance of relationality, intersubjectivity, and what Judith Butler sees as an endless undertaking of subjects being '(re)constituted through dialectical processes of recognition, within multiple networks of power' (Mitchell, 2007, p. 711). So, while conventional cosmopolitanism advocates an ethics based on universal rights and responsibilities, its critical variant is founded upon a feminist ethics of care that conceives of ethics as something that cannot be set out as abstract principles but which emerges through specific sites and social relationships producing the need for care (Gilligan, 1982;Held, 1993Held, , 1995Jagger, 1989Jagger, , 1991Jagger, , 1995Koehn, 1998;Lawson, 2007;Tronto, 1993). Nevertheless, this critical perspective still relies on a theoretical foundation that advocates care as a guiding ethical principal.…”
Section: Cosmopolitanism Empathy and Carementioning
confidence: 97%
“…I understand the ethics of care to be the ethics that was first given voice to by Carol Gilligan (1982) and Nel Noddings (1984) in the early 1980s, and subsequently taken up and elaborated upon by a number of moral philosophers (see, for example, the essays in Kittay and Meyers 1987; Jaggar 1995; and Bowden 1997). I am interested in care ethics insomuch as it has something to offer moral philosophy in general.…”
Section: Forms Of Particularismmentioning
confidence: 99%