Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation

Seidman, Jeffrey

doi:10.26556/jesp.v3i1.28

Cited by 8 publications

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References 2 publications

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“… See Frankfurt (1999a, p. 139; 1999b, p. 174). 7 See, for example,Shoemaker (2003),Jaworska (2007aJaworska ( , 2007b,Helm (2009a& 2009b), and Seidman (2008.…”

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Love and the Anatomy of Needing Another

Wonderly¹

2022

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology

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The idea that we need our beloveds has a rich and longstanding history in classic literature, pop culture, social sciences, and of course philosophical treatments of love. Yet, on a little reflection, the idea that one needs one’s beloved is as puzzling as it is familiar. In what, if any sense, do we really need our beloveds? And insofar as we do need them, is this feature of love something to be celebrated or lamented? In the relevant philosophical literature, there are various ways of understanding the type(s) of psychological need internal to love and whether and how the necessity in question contributes to love’s value. In this chapter, I survey and critically analyse several accounts of felt necessity in love, and advocate for a philosophically neglected perspective on the nature and value of needing our beloveds.

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“… See Frankfurt (1999a, p. 139; 1999b, p. 174). 7 See, for example,Shoemaker (2003),Jaworska (2007aJaworska ( , 2007b,Helm (2009a& 2009b), and Seidman (2008.…”

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confidence: 99%

Love and the Anatomy of Needing Another

Wonderly¹

2022

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology

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Caring and incapacity

Seidman

2009

Philos Stud

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This essay seeks to explain a morally important class of psychological incapacity-the class of what Bernard Williams has called ''incapacities of character.'' I argue for two main claims: (1) Caring is the underlying psychological disposition that gives rise to incapacities of character. (2) In competent, rational adults, caring is, in part, a cognitive and deliberative disposition. Caring is a mental state which disposes an agent to believe certain considerations to be good reasons for deliberation and action. And caring is a mental state which structures an agent's practical deliberation, by establishing presumptive boundaries on the landscape of possibilities over which her deliberative imagination ranges. Incapacities of character are a consequence of the structure which these presumptive boundaries give to an agent's deliberation.Bernard Williams has argued that a person may find that she is incapable of doing something, because her character renders it ''unthinkable'' for her. A person's character is revealed not merely by her actions, but by such incapacities, Williams claims. I think that this claim is correct. To the extent that it is, it helps give determinate shape to a large question: what does a person's character consist in? What are the underlying psychological dispositions which constitute a person's character, and how do they manifest themselves in the incapacities Williams identifies? In what follows, I will argue that a person's character is constituted, in

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On being attached

Wonderly

2015

Philos Stud

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We often use the term ''attachment'' to describe our emotional connectedness to objects in the world. We become attached to our careers, to our homes, to certain ideas, and perhaps most importantly, to other people. Interestingly, despite its import and ubiquity in our everyday lives, the topic of attachment per se has been largely ignored in the philosophy literature. I address this lacuna by identifying (a type of) attachment as a rich ''mode of mattering'' that can help to inform certain aspects of agency and emotion. First, drawing on insights from Ancient stoicism and developmental and clinical psychology, I suggest that the relevant form of attachment involves a felt need for its object and a particular relationship between the object and the attached agent's sense of security. I then argue that these features serve to distinguish the attitude from the more philosophically familiar notion of caring. Finally, I show that recognizing this form of attachment as a distinct mode of mattering has important implications for understanding grief.

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Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation

Cited by 8 publications

References 2 publications

Love and the Anatomy of Needing Another

Love and the Anatomy of Needing Another

Caring and incapacity

On being attached

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