2013
DOI: 10.1007/s10898-013-0068-8
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Carbon tax based on the emission factor: a bilevel programming approach

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Cited by 10 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 22 publications
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“…Objective Solution [3] lot-sizing carbon price min costs analytical [4] green investment cap-and-trade max profit analytical [5] inventory-routing cap-and-trade min costs branch and price [6] green investments cap-and-trade min total costs analytical [7] reverse logistics cap-and-trade max NPV solver [8] revenue sharing cap-and-trade max profit analytical [14] social welfare carbon tax min deviation solver [15] renewable energy carbon credits min credits KKT & algorithm [16] country incentives carbon tax max GDP NSGA-II [17] tax allocation carbon tax max GDP analytical [18] revenue sharing cap-and-trade max profit analytical [19] cooperation cap-and-trade max profit analytical [20] carbon mechanism cap-and-trade max profit analytical…”
Section: Reference Problem Comentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Objective Solution [3] lot-sizing carbon price min costs analytical [4] green investment cap-and-trade max profit analytical [5] inventory-routing cap-and-trade min costs branch and price [6] green investments cap-and-trade min total costs analytical [7] reverse logistics cap-and-trade max NPV solver [8] revenue sharing cap-and-trade max profit analytical [14] social welfare carbon tax min deviation solver [15] renewable energy carbon credits min credits KKT & algorithm [16] country incentives carbon tax max GDP NSGA-II [17] tax allocation carbon tax max GDP analytical [18] revenue sharing cap-and-trade max profit analytical [19] cooperation cap-and-trade max profit analytical [20] carbon mechanism cap-and-trade max profit analytical…”
Section: Reference Problem Comentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ref. [14] study the carbon tax and cap and trade policies using a bilevel programming model. They solve it by using the KKT conditions and assess how the optimal design of the tax system is related to social welfare, inducing cement producers to shift towards more environmentally friendly combustibles.…”
Section: Introduction and Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The problem of electricity market expansion for studying the future generation mix or the CO 2 emission abatement has been studied in [6]- [13], with least cost generation expansion planning models, and in [14]- [21], with imperfectly competitive market evolution models. However, the electricity market expansion problem with emission and fast response dispatchable capacity incentive policies has not been investigated in the literature.…”
Section: B Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Incentive policies for renewable energies and emission reduction are also calculated using bilevel optimization models. Minimizing the total technology installation and operation costs in the lower level problem in [12] (or maximizing the social welfare in the lower level problem in [13]), the total policy intervention is minimized in the upper level problem to calculate the incentive policies of renewable subsidization or carbon taxation.…”
Section: B Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite the demonstrated advantages of an EIS, little work has been done to investigate the optimal design of EIS scheme parameters. While [14] has considered the design of an optimal tax under an EIS in the context of the cement industry, it does not consider subsidies paid to those below the emissionsintensity baseline. Similarly, while [13] conducts an indepth analysis of the long-run implications of an EIS variant, little work is done to analyse the short-run effects of such a scheme.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%