Carbon emissions, technology upgradation and financing risk of the green supply chain competition

Wu, Tao; Kung, Chih-Chun

doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2019.119884

Cited by 64 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Extending from the basic model, Li et al [14] further discuss the equilibrium solutions under asymmetrical Nash bargaining model, in which the retailer and the manufacturer bargain on a cost-sharing rate or a revenue-sharing rate. Wu and Kung [29] find that if the government wants to publish some preferential policies to encourage the adoption of green technology in the supply chain, it should choose the party with higher bargaining power. Matsui [19] finds that the manufacturer achieves its highest profit by bargaining the wholesale price earlier than determining the direct price.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Shang

Qin

et al. 2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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The main body of competition has changed from the competition between enterprises to the competition between supply chains. The cooperation of the chain-to-chain attracts large attention from entrepreneurs and scholars in an increasingly competitive environment. Thus, this paper studies a chain-to-chain system with price competition consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain under carbon cap-and-trade regulation. Considering vertical-horizontal cooperation, the six different models are established by introducing the structural cooperation and the contractual cooperation (adopting the wholesale price contract) of supply chains. Based on the Stackelbeg game and Nash game, the optimal solutions of six models are obtained. The results show that the decisions, profits, and social welfare of the supply chains are affected by the structural cooperation than the contractual cooperation. The asymmetric competition structure changes the bargaining power of the supply chains. The relationship of supply chains' pricing only is affected by the cooperation structures. The relationship of the cap setting, profits, and social welfare are affected by the cooperation structures and the main decision parameters.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Shang

Qin

et al. 2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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“…Paying attention to 'green' issues has been a key motive for industrial practitioners and scholars in the last few decades. From the academic viewpoint, researchers gradually switch their attention from general deliberation to constructs such as green HRM practices (Singh, Del Giudice, Chierici, & Graziano, 2020), green supply chain competition (Wu & Kung, 2020), green bonds (Tolliver, Keeley, & Managi, 2020), and green innovation (Singh et al, 2020;Zhang, Liang, Feng, Yuan, & Jiang, 2020). All over the world, business trends have changed rapidly because of the competitive environment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate social responsibility and environmental performance: The mediating role of environmental strategy and green innovation

Kraus

Rehman

Garcia

2020

Technological Forecasting and Social Change

625

479

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“…Second, there exists numerous studies exploring the evolution of global carbon markets as well as their shortcomings, difficulties, and solutions (e.g., Braun 2009 ; Caney 2010 ; Sovacool et al 2011 ; Hall et al 2018 ; Zhou and Li 2019 ). The third aspect is regarding risk measures associated with carbon trading, including the price risk of derivatives, policy risk, market risk, and technology risk (e.g., Blyth and Buun 2011 ; Reboredo and Ugando 2015 ; Wu and Kung 2020 ).…”

Section: Institutional Background and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon emissions trading policy, carbon finance, and carbon emissions reduction: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Guo

Chiao

2021

Econ Change Restruct

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The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the implementation of carbon emissions trading policy (CETP) promotes carbon finance, proxied by investment and financing facilitating carbon emissions reduction (IFCER), and reduces carbon emissions. Evidence shows that first, CETP is effective in stimulating IFCER and reducing carbon emissions. Second, the effects of CETP persist over time. Third, the effects of CETP taking effect in pilot regions can spill over to non-pilot regions nearby. Fourth, the effect is more pronounced in eastern and wealthy regions. Finally, R&D and industrial upgrading have a mediating effect linking CETP to IFCER and carbon emissions.

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Carbon emissions, technology upgradation and financing risk of the green supply chain competition

Cited by 64 publications

References 23 publications

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Withdrawn: Optimal cap setting and pricing in supply chains under vertical-horizontal cooperation and cap-and-trade regulation

Corporate social responsibility and environmental performance: The mediating role of environmental strategy and green innovation

Carbon emissions trading policy, carbon finance, and carbon emissions reduction: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

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