Capitalists against Markets

Abstract

Challenges the conventional wisdom that welfare state builders take their cues solely from labor and other progressive interests. It argues instead that pragmatic social reformers in the U.S. and Sweden looked for support from above as well as below, taking into account capitalists’ interests and preferences in the political process. Legislation associated with the American New Deal and Swedish social democracy was built, consequently, on cross‐class alliances of interest. Capitalists in both countries appreciated the regulatory impact of reformist social and labor legislation. Their interests in such legislation derived from their distinct systems of labor market governance. Thus, new theory and historical evidence in this book illuminate the political conditions for greater equality and security in capitalist societies.

Institutional change in varieties of capitalism

“…Therefore, institutional arrangements in one sphere of the political economy condition the positions that actors take on institutional reform in other spheres. Swenson's (2002) comparison of pension politics in Sweden and the U.S. provides a nice example of this point. He shows how institutions developed in the arena of industrial relations during the 1930s conditioned the types of pension policies employers were willing to support in the 1950s.…”

“…First, while the emphasis on employer interests does not imply that other actors (labour, governments) are unimportant, it underscores a crucial assumption, namely, that the institutions and practices of capitalist political economies can rarely be sustained over time without the active support of at least some powerful segments of capital (see, especially, Swenson, 2002). Moreover, as we have noted, the varieties-of-capitalism framework holds that most institutions in the political economy rest not on practices of passive rule-following by firms, but on a more active process in which entrepreneurial actors seek to advance their interests, including in contexts of strategic interaction where institutions can improve the well-being of those who participate in them by resolving collective action dilemmas.…”

“…Instead, active support for a specific mode of coordination must be mobilized on a relatively continuous basis from actors who are conscious of the limitations as well as the advantages of any particular course of action. Achieving and maintaining coordination usually also involves the exercise of power, because forging and maintaining particular institutional arrangements creates winners and losers, notably on both sides of the class divide (Moe, 2005;Swenson, 2002;Gruber, 2000;Offe and Wiesenthal, 1986). Here again, some factors militate in favour of continuity in the institutional landscape.…”

“…Influenced by the varieties-of-capitalism perspective, a promising literature in comparative political economy is beginning to link institutional analysis to coalitional analysis (Iversen and Soskice, 2007;Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005;Thelen, 2004;Mares, 2003;Huber and Stephens, 2001;Swenson, 2002). Much of it traces the genesis of important institutional configurations to specific sets of coalitions, formed either among producer groups or within the electoral arena, many of them cross-class coalitions.…”

Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth Century

“…Unions and left parties certainly played a role in this process, as argued by Korpi, but we can only understand this role if we take into account the organization of the economy and why employers in some cases had an interest in cross-class collaboration. The strength of the left is in some measure a function of the institutional choices made by employers and the 14 In particular Hall and Soskice 2001;Swenson 2002;Mares 2003;and Iversen 2005. 15 Estevez-Abe et al 2001;Cusack et al 2007. right in the 1920s and earlier.…”