Capitalising on Institutional Co-Investment Platforms

Financing Energy Innovation: The Need for New Intermediaries in Clean Energy

“…They evidence the adverse selection problem as a driver of the underperformance of co-investments relative to direct investments because institutional investors can only invest in deals that are available to them. However, Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015) [27] and Monk and Sharma (2015) [77] highlight that the skills needed to assess and manage these assets are very hard to boil down into a single organization, and disintermediation may not be an optimal option, especially when investment management skills of the organization are not mature enough (Disintermediation occurs when a traditional intermediary gets pushed out by other firms, or when the services it provides become irrelevant in a marketplace that offers other ways to get the same kind of transaction done).…”

“…They evidence the adverse selection problem as a driver of the underperformance of co-investments relative to direct investments because institutional investors can only invest in deals that are available to them. However, Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015) [27] and Monk and Sharma (2015) [77] highlight that the skills needed to assess and manage these assets are very hard to boil down into a single organization, and disintermediation may not be an optimal This gap leads us to revisit the intermediation theory and practice. Traditional intermediation theories that are based on the models of resource allocation in perfect and complete markets highlight the importance of intermediation in addressing market frictions, such as transaction costs and asymmetric information (see, for example, [18][19][20][21][22][23]).…”

Financing Energy Innovation: The Need for New Intermediaries in Clean Energy

“…They evidence the adverse selection problem as a driver of the underperformance of co-investments relative to direct investments because institutional investors can only invest in deals that are available to them. However, Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015) [27] and Monk and Sharma (2015) [77] highlight that the skills needed to assess and manage these assets are very hard to boil down into a single organization, and disintermediation may not be an optimal This gap leads us to revisit the intermediation theory and practice. Traditional intermediation theories that are based on the models of resource allocation in perfect and complete markets highlight the importance of intermediation in addressing market frictions, such as transaction costs and asymmetric information (see, for example, [18][19][20][21][22][23]).…”

Towards collaborative infrastructure procurement

“…PE funds typically have maturities that are shorter than the lifetime of the infrastructure asset and they often are highly leveraged, which may not be optimal for pension investments (Panayiotou & Medda, 2014). Partly due to this, the trend of pension funds and other longterm institutional investors is to increase the share of their direct investments in infrastructure (Monk & Sharma, 2015;Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2019). Recently, Larry Fink, CEO of the world's largest asset manager Blackrock, said that his firm wanted to be part of public-private efforts to improve financing mechanisms for sustainable infrastructure investments and urged other CEOs to follow suit (Fink, 2020).…”

“…Our work is related to research on the governance of infrastructure projects (for example Levitt & Eriksson, 2016) and studies discussing the best ways for pension funds and other institutional investors to make infrastructure investments (for example Monk & Sharma, 2015;Vecchi et al, 2017;Halland et al, 2018). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibilities to adopt increased collaboration in an infrastructure project, between the public sector and investors in a country which has little history of PPPs, and has relied on traditional ways of public sector funded and owned infrastructure procurement.…”