Capital Confusion: The Effect of Jury Instructions on the Decision to Impose Death

Abstract

In criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to the accused the right of trial byjury.' Historically, the jury has been exalted as the conscience of the community and as a buffer between the state and the accused. 2 At the same time, however, there have been fears ofjuror incompetence and partiality. Juries that cannot or will not apply the law pose a danger to the liberties of a defendant. This concern is particularly relevant in capital cases where the severity and finality of the "ultimate" punishment require an accurate application of the law. This comment discusses the sentencing jury's comprehension and application of the law in capital cases. Beginning with Section Two, this comment explores the jury's role as finder of fact, while warning against the danger of giving juries discretionary power which could lead to jury nullification. Section Three provides an overview of the sentencer's role in death penalty cases, focusing specifically on the Supreme Court's efforts to resolve the tension between avoiding the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty and handing down a sentence suited to the individual defendant. Section Four analyzes the effectiveness of pattern jury instructions, including evidence of juror incomprehension of such instructions. Finally, in Section Five, this comment concludes that defendants in death penalty cases must have the right to appellate review of juror comprehension of instructions. Without this right, defendants are not fully protected against the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. I The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury..." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also article III, § 2, ci. 3: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.. ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 2 JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 277 (1988) (citations omitted).

Clarifying life and death matters: An analysis of instructional comprehension and penalty phase closing arguments.

“…law. Capital sentencing instructions are no exception to this general rule (e.g., Cho, 1994; Diamond, 1993: Haney & Lynch, 1994; Radelet, 1993; Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995). In addition, capital weighing instructions of the sort that are so prevalent in death penalty jurisdictions in the United States contain at least four special areas of potential confusion.…”

Advances in Psychology and Law

“…Death penalty cases require special considerations to ensure defendants' rights to due process and protection against cruel and unusual punishment are not violated (Cho, 1994 ). These special considerations are primarily focused on avoiding the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.…”

“…If the defendant is found guilty, then the jury must determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. The courts rely on jury instructions to guide juries through this process (Cho, 1994 ;Crocker, 1997 ).…”

Capital punishment, the moratorium movement, and empirical questions: Looking beyond innocence, race, and bad lawyering in death penalty cases.

“…9–12; Luginbuhl, 1992; Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995), which are inconsistent with constitutional ( McKoy v. North Carolina , 1990; Mills v. Maryland , 1988) and legislative rules that permit a single juror to conclude that a mitigating factor has been established, even if no other juror agrees, and almost always stipulate that mitigating factors can be accepted if established by a preponderance of the evidence (Acker & Lanier, 1995a, p. 35). Indeed, jurors apparently even have difficulty grasping the basic concept of “mitigation” (Haney & Lynch 1994; Tiersma, 1995), which goes to the core of their sentencing duties (Cho, 1994; Lockett v. Ohio , 1978).…”