Candidate Recruitment and Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis

Siavelis, Peter M.; Morgenstern, Scott

doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2008.00029.x

Cited by 63 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…An additional analytical category is the degree of institutionalization of the rules in place (Reiser 2014;Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). For example, subjective informal selection criteria can be informally institutionalized within political parties in that they are widely known, accepted, and enforced within a network of institutional actors, whereas formal selection criteria may be written down but not always institutionalized and implemented.…”

Section: Dynamic Configurations Of Formalization and Institutionalizamentioning

confidence: 99%

Revealing the “Secret Garden”: The Informal Dimensions of Political Recruitment

Bjarnegård

Kenny²

2015

Pol & Gen

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Candidate selection and recruitment has been notably described as the “secret garden” of politics—an obscure process, often hidden from view, that is regulated largely by internal party rules, informal practices, and power relationships (cf. Gallagher and Marsh 1988). In this contribution, we contend that informal party practices and their gendered consequences are critically important for understanding the continuity of male political dominance and female underrepresentation. Rather than make a strict separation between formal and informal rules in the recruitment process, we argue that gender politics scholars must instead identify and empirically investigate the specific combinations of such rules that impact upon women's and men's political participation in parties. The proposed approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of the bounded nature and variable outcomes of institutional innovation and party change.

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Section: Dynamic Configurations Of Formalization and Institutionalizamentioning

confidence: 99%

Revealing the “Secret Garden”: The Informal Dimensions of Political Recruitment

Bjarnegård

Kenny²

2015

Pol & Gen

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“…In contrast, in many parts of the world where women are more likely to be candidates, such as Europe, there is a party loyalist model-candidates are picked by party elites. 60 This selection process has been shown to increase the number of women candidates. 61 Many of these same systems also have a proportional representation (PR) system, where candidates are placed on party lists and multiple candidates from these lists are chosen based 2 mçäáíáÅë~åÇ íÜÉ iáÑÉ pÅáÉåÅÉë • c~ää OMNS • îçäK PRI åçK O Gender, risk assessment, and political ambition on the proportion of the vote each party receives.…”

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confidence: 99%

Gender, risk assessment, and political ambition

Sweet-Cushman

2016

Polit. life sci.

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ABSTRACT. In the United States, women have long held the right to vote and can participate fully in the political process, and yet they are underrepresented at all levels of elected office. Worldwide, men's dominance in the realm of politics has also been the norm. To date, scholars have focused on supply-side and demand-side explanations of women's underrepresentation but differences in how men and women assess electoral risk (the risk involved in seeking political office) are not fully explained. To fill this gap, I explore how evolutionary theory offers insights into gendered differences in political ambition and the evaluation of electoral risk. Using the framework of life-history theory, I hypothesize that both cognitive and environmental factors in human evolution, particularly as they relate to sexual selection and social roles, have shaped the psychology of ambition in gendered ways affecting contemporary politics. Cognitive risk-assessment mechanisms evolving in the hominid line came to be expressed differently in females and males, in women and men. These gendered expressions plausibly reflect differentiable environmental pressures in the past and may help explain behaviors in and barriers to women's electoral political activity in the present. If so, then the success of efforts to increase such activity -or, regressively, to suppress it -may be better understood.Key words: Political ambition, gender differences, evolutionary theory, electoral risk assessment M ale officeholders are the norm in political representation both worldwide and in the United States in particular. Across the globe, gender parity in political representation is unusual, and instances of women's overrepresentation are extremely rare. 1 In the United States, women make up slightly more than half of the population and earned the right to vote and participate fully in the political process many decades ago. Nevertheless, in recent U.S. history, less than a quarter of state legislators have been women; women have held few state executive offices; and women have comprised less than 20 percent of the membership of the U.S. Congress. 2 Proponents of greater gender equality in U.S. political representation continue to wonder why more women do not run for or hold political office when so many of the societal and structural barriers to their participation have diminished. The leading explanations tend to focus on candidate emergence and cultural doi: 10.1017/pls.2016.13Correspondence: Jennie Sweet-Cushman, Department of History, Political Science, and International Studies, Chatham University, 0 Woodland Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15232. Email: jsweetcushman@chatham.edu and psychological factors that contribute to men and women having different levels of political ambition. 3,4 However, these theories do not address what I consider to be critical questions: What role does electoral risk play in political ambition, and can evolutionary theory provide insight into gendered differences in risk assessment and political ambition? I argue that the ...

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“…In addition, parties may be able to head off dissent before it becomes a problem. Specifically, leaders can use the party's candidate selection rules to recruit individuals who share their preferences and to weed out uncongenial candidates before they get to the legislature (Kam ; Siavelis and Morgenstern ). This form of strategic behavior on the part of party leaders affects the party coefficient

γ

in regression Equation , as it confounds the effect of party discipline applied after elections with a selection effect of like‐minded individuals prior to elections (Kam ).…”

Section: Sources Of Legislative Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

Alemán

Micozzi

Pinto

et al. 2017

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine legislators conducted in 2007–08. Our findings indicate that partisanship is the most important determinant of legislative voting, leaving little room for personal ideological position to affect legislators' behavior.

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Candidate Recruitment and Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis

Cited by 63 publications

References 22 publications

Revealing the “Secret Garden”: The Informal Dimensions of Political Recruitment

Revealing the “Secret Garden”: The Informal Dimensions of Political Recruitment

Gender, risk assessment, and political ambition

Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

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