Candidate ideology and electoral success in congressional elections

Carson, Jamie L.; Williamson, Ryan D.

doi:10.1007/s11127-017-0492-2

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…If elected officials were exclusively inferring ideological congruence from partisan cues, bipartisan endorsements should be favored over out-partisan endorsements. Appendix E shows that endorsements from both parties were also not favored over out-partisan cues in more competitive districts, where moderate policies are rewarded (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; Carson and Williamson 2018). Together, these results are consistent with a pattern of in-group favoritism.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Endorsements by members of both parties attracted no more interest than out-partisan endorsements, and significantly less interest than the co-partisan policy. Nor did bipartisan endorsements attract more interest in politically competitive communities, where voters reward moderate policies (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; Carson and Williamson 2018). Hence, partisan cues do not seem to be used exclusively to filter policies that better reflect the preferences of the constituency.…”

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confidence: 99%

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How do Public Officials Learn About Policy? A Field Experiment on Policy Diffusion

Pereira

2021

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Prior research suggests that partisanship can influence how legislators learn from each other. However, same-party governments are also more likely to share similar issues, ideological preferences and constituency demands. Establishing a causal link between partisanship and policy learning is difficult. In collaboration with a non-profit organization, this study isolates the role of partisanship in a real policy learning context. As part of a campaign promoting a new policy among local representatives in the United States, the study randomized whether the initiative was endorsed by co-partisans, out-partisans or both parties. The results show that representatives are systematically more interested in the same policy when it is endorsed by co-partisans. Bipartisan initiatives also attract less interest than co-partisan policies, and no more interest than out-partisan policies, even in more competitive districts. Together, the results suggest that ideological considerations cannot fully explain partisan-based learning. The study contributes to scholarship on policy diffusion, legislative signaling and interest group access.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

How do Public Officials Learn About Policy? A Field Experiment on Policy Diffusion

Pereira

2021

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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“…As noted in the Introduction, Bartels (2016) suggests that US presidential candidates' extreme positions may be explained in a large part by their own ideologies. Carson and Williamson (2017) find that when candidates in races for the US House of Representatives move towards platforms that are extreme relative to voters, they are less likely to win. As for multi-party races, Wagner and Meyer (2017) find support for the notion that although radical right parties in Europe have remained niche players, they have affected the positioning of mainstream parties across the spectrum.…”

Section: Idealist Fringesmentioning

confidence: 89%

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

Ronayne

2018

Public Choice

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In the classic Hotelling-Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters' preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (1) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (2) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (3) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.

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“…A Downsian model suggests rewards for moderation, but the literature is mixed. There is evidence suggesting more extreme congressional candidates do worse (Burden, 2004;Carson and Williamson, 2018), but presidential candidates do not appear to suffer a penalty for being more ideologically extreme (Cohen et al, 2016).…”

Section: Amateurs Professionals and Motivations For Political Activismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Amateur hour: The dominance of purposive benefits among local political party chairs

Roscoe

Jenkins

2021

Social Science Quarterly

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Prevailing theories posit some party activists are amateurs, driven primarily by purposive benefits, while other activists are professionals, motivated mostly by material benefits. The decline of patronage and the rise of polarization suggest reexamining the relevancy of this distinction. Methods: The study uses data from a 2019 survey of 1,060 local party chairs in the United States, covering 49 states. Results: Most respondents are motivated by purposive benefits, while career motivations are relatively rare. Those who do derive material benefits are only slightly more centrist than their peers and are no more pragmatic and no less likely to derive purposive benefits. A substantial segment of local chairs are interested in seeking elective office, but the motivations of these individuals with ambitions connected to party activism are dominated by purposive benefits as much as those of the unambitious. Conclusion:The study demonstrates the professional-amateur typology no longer accurately characterizes local party activists.A series of seminal studies in the 1960s and 1970s examined the motivations of local political activists and divided these activists into two main camps: the amateurs and the professionals (

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Candidate ideology and electoral success in congressional elections

Cited by 7 publications

References 35 publications

How do Public Officials Learn About Policy? A Field Experiment on Policy Diffusion

How do Public Officials Learn About Policy? A Field Experiment on Policy Diffusion

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

Amateur hour: The dominance of purposive benefits among local political party chairs

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