Cancelable iris-templates using key-dependent wavelet transforms

Hämmerle-Uhl, Jutta; Pschernig, Elias; Uhl, Andreas

doi:10.1109/icb.2013.6612960

Cited by 11 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(32 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…b) Non-Invertible Transformations: this template protection relies on non-invertible parametric transformations. Some relevant examples are the Cartesian and Polar transformations [29], Wavelet-based methods [30], [31], or Random Projections [32]. c) Filter-based methods: these could also be understood as non-invertible transformations, since they rely on the noninvertibility of the chosen filter operations.…”

Section: B On Template Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Security of Biometrics and Fuzzy Commitment Cryptosystems: A Study on Gait Authentication

hamme¹,

Rúa

Preuveneers

et al. 2021

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As biometric templates consist of highly correlated features, the real security level offered by biometric authentication systems remains an open research question. In this work we provide new approximations and a lower bound of the security offered by fuzzy commitment schemes. Fuzzy commitment cryptosystems and in general biometric template protection schemes play an important role in allowing for remote storage and processing of biometric data, as they mitigate the threat of biometric template leakage. The use of such schemes would alleviate some of the usability constraints imposed by the state-ofpractice local use of biometrics. As such we conduct an in-depth security analysis for IMU based gait authentication systems, where we evaluate the effectiveness of attacks within the scope of two well-defined threat models that target both unprotected and protected systems. A pivotal enabler of our analysis is the development of nine different approaches to gait authentication, which allows us to perform intramodal fusion on these distinct, yet highly correlated biometric templates, and to protect them with a strengthened fuzzy commitment scheme. Our analysis clearly demonstrates the high correlation between the different biometric templates, which, among others, further showcases the threat of biometric template leakage. Furthermore, as our analysis incorporates a threat model that assumes biometric template leakage, it provides metrics for the security provided by the biometric modality itself.

show abstract

Section: B On Template Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Security of Biometrics and Fuzzy Commitment Cryptosystems: A Study on Gait Authentication

hamme¹,

Rúa

Preuveneers

et al. 2021

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Specifically, in the permutation operation, blocks of the feature texture are rearranged, controlled by a permutation key, and in the remapping operation, some blocks are mapped on top of the other blocks to make the reconstruction of the iris image more difficult. In [25], Hämmerle-Uhl et al implemented key-dependent wavelet transformations to build non-invertible iris templates. In this approach, the extracted iris features are highly sensitive to slight variations in key parameters.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cancelable Iris- and Steganography-Based User Authentication System for the Internet of Things

Yang

Wang

et al. 2019

Sensors

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Remote user authentication for Internet of Things (IoT) devices is critical to IoT security, as it helps prevent unauthorized access to IoT networks. Biometrics is an appealing authentication technique due to its advantages over traditional password-based authentication. However, the protection of biometric data itself is also important, as original biometric data cannot be replaced or reissued if compromised. In this paper, we propose a cancelable iris- and steganography-based user authentication system to provide user authentication and secure the original iris data. Most of the existing cancelable iris biometric systems need a user-specific key to guide feature transformation, e.g., permutation or random projection, which is also known as key-dependent transformation. One issue associated with key-dependent transformations is that if the user-specific key is compromised, some useful information can be leaked and exploited by adversaries to restore the original iris feature data. To mitigate this risk, the proposed scheme enhances system security by integrating an effective information-hiding technique—steganography. By concealing the user-specific key, the threat of key exposure-related attacks, e.g., attacks via record multiplicity, can be defused, thus heightening the overall system security and complementing the protection offered by cancelable biometric techniques.

show abstract