Canada’s top public servants meet agency theory in the Harper years (2006–2015)

Abstract

A survey of Canada’s top public servants was used to test the effects on them of the agency version of the public service bargain held by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper (2006–2015). Most results were as expected: increasing politicization and prime ministerial influence added much complexity to the deputy minister’s job; and ministers’ political staffers acted as guardians of the agency bargain. However, the survey led to the observation of a decline in ministers’ powers and to the surprising increase of the parliamentary accountability of deputy ministers, as well as to some challenge to the concept of public service bargains. Points for practitioners It is a good idea to consider what the main components of the public service bargain are in any public workplace, that is, what expectations exist about duties, competencies, criteria of evaluation, rewards, and discipline for permanent employees and political staffers. Too strong an agency bargain creates confusion about responsibilities, accountability, and a culture of risk avoidance. Staffers should not disrupt the chain of command and should treat public servants with respect and courtesy.

Leadership on the run: time management among deputy ministers in Canada

“…The activity of DMs in Canada has been analyzed independently of their time management approaches in decision-making (Balls, 1976), in their role as members of the administrative machinery (Bourgault and Dion, 1989, 2016) and in strategic planning as part of the broader senior executive cadre (Elbanna et al ., 2016). The literature has also looked at the increased politicization of senior public servants (Heintzman, 2016; Bourgault and Gow, 2020), their role in public sector bargaining (Bourgault, 2011; Bourgault and Van Dorpe, 2013).…”

The Practice and Politics of Secretary General Appointments

“…In Lewis (2008) terms: is it loyalty or ability that gets senior bureaucrats appointed? Second, the core executive literature suggests a third key predictor: central agency experience (Bourgault & Gow, 2020;Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990).…”

“…In Bach et al’s (2020) study, senior-level appointments in Dutch central government are perceived to be only slightly politicized. This reflects a formal policy where ministers have a say in SG appointments as part of a merit-based process (Bourgault & Gow, 2020). Van der Velde (2021) does not find evidence of party-political considerations in SG appointments in the Netherlands, based on a quantitative analysis of 63 appointments between 1994 and 2020.…”

“…A third set of factors is derived from the core executive literature, which stresses the growing influence of the center on government processes, including appointments (Bourgault & Gow, 2020; Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990; Weller et al, 2021). In the dominant view in the literature, governments are run from the center.…”

The time management styles of deputy ministers in Canada: Towards a taxonomy

“…Various studies have reported an increased focus on managerial and routine management tasks for this cadre (Bourgault, 2011; Dutil & Migone, 2021; Evans et al, 2014), almost sliding into “paradoxical managerialism” (Bourgault & Dunn, 2014, p. 449). Other authors have noted an increase in the politicization of senior public servants from a behavioural perspective (Bourgault & Gow, 2020; Heintzman, 2016), and by looking at their appointments.…”