Canada and the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Holland, Kenneth

doi:10.1080/11926422.2021.1880949

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…One option, superbly described by Kenneth Holland (2021), is for Canada to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the "Quad")-the US, Japan, Australia, and India-an informal forum on defence that is drawing hard lines in the geopolitical sand for a "free and open Indo-Pacific." Holland makes compelling arguments in favour of Canadian participation in the Quad, based on Beijing's tensions with Canada, the dangers that the Communist Party of China (CCP) pose to the rules-based international order, and the shared purpose in an "Asian arc of democracy."…”

Section: Trajectorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Canada’s Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity: Cooperation and Diplomatic Presence in Southeast Asia

Williams,

Haynes

2023

CPSR

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This article examines Canada’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As one of only a select group of 10 countries from outside of Southeast Asia that is a Dialogue Partner with ASEAN, Canada has gained important diplomatic and market presence in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, Canada’s national interests are advanced through the accession to TAC by supporting a rules-based system of regional order. The foundations of ASEAN—based on sovereignty, consensus, and the process of informality—make the “ASEAN Way” frustrating to proponents of an “independent” and “activist” foreign policy for Canada, especially as human rights abuses have unfolded in the region and the state of democracy remains a mixed record. However, Canada’s only method for securing economic interests, and just as critically, to promote a rules-based international order for the Indo-Pacific that is not dominated by China, is to participate with ASEAN as a TAC signatory.RésuméCet article examine l'adhésion du Canada au Traité d'amitié et de coopération (TAC) avec l'Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-est (ANASE). En tant que l'un des seuls groupes restreints parmi dix pays de l'extérieur de l'Asie du Sud-est à être un partenaire de dialogue avec l'ASEAN, le Canada a acquis une présence diplomatique et commerciale importante dans l'Indopacifique. De plus, les intérêts nationaux du Canada sont favorisés par l'adhésion à l'ATC en soutenant un système d'ordre régional fondé sur des règles. Les fondements de l’ANASE, la souveraineté, le consensus et le processus de l'informalité, rendent la « voie de l'ANASE » frustrante pour les partisans d'une politique étrangère « indépendante » et « activiste » pour le Canada, d'autant plus que des violations des droits de la personne se sont produites dans la région. Et l'état de la démocratie reste un bilan mitigé. Cependant, la seule méthode du Canada pour sécuriser les intérêts économiques, et tout aussi critique, pour promouvoir un ordre international fondé sur des règles pour l'Indopacifique qui n'est pas dominé par la Chine, est de participer avec l'ASEAN en tant que signataire du TAC.Keywords: Canadian Foreign Policy; ASEAN; Southeast AsiaMots-clés : Politique étrangère canadienne ; ASEAN ; Asie du sud est

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Section: Trajectorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Canada’s Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity: Cooperation and Diplomatic Presence in Southeast Asia

Williams,

Haynes

2023

CPSR

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“…This would help to develop off-ramps if traditional US-led institutions and networks become too restrictive, collapse, and/or to push back against American unilateralism in the hopes of assisting a course correction in Washington's strategic thinking, including in part by demonstrating more burden-sharing being undertaken by allies and partners. 65 Such a grouping of states, therefore, is not just about organizing to pressure and balance China, specifically by increasing the costs of coercive behaviour to alter the calculus in Beijing in its foreign engagements, but as well it is about promoting a system where those states occupy greater positions of power and agency. 66 Doing so will require the US to adjust its grand strategic psychology from being the indispensable (and only) leader to being more of a peer, even though it will remain materially preponderant for decades to come.…”

Section: Selective Minilateralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Canadian Indo-Pacific geopolitical orientation

MacDonald

Vance

2021

International Journal

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There is growing consensus that Canada needs to “do more” in the Indo-Pacific region as it becomes the centre of gravity in a changing international landscape—a landscape challenging several traditional assumptions about the nature and configuration of global power which Canadian foreign policy has rested upon for decades, specifically due to the emergence of Sino-American rivalry. It is clear Canada needs a regional approach which is rooted in and better informed by geopolitical considerations, but there remains an absence of analytical frameworks to compare and evaluate alternative approaches. In addressing this void, this paper sketches out and compares four possible orientations Canada could pursue towards the Indo-Pacific region: Minimal Engagement, US-Aligned Confrontation, Regional Multilateralism, and Selective Minilateralism. Remaining agnostic about which one(s) Canada should choose, the paper is designed to highlight the stark trade-offs Canada must increasingly confront as it navigates this uncertain environment.

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“…Advocates of the balancing approach such as Gilley (2011), McDonough (2012), and Holland (2021 point to the absence of structural or normative incentives to bandwagon with China in the current hegemonic flux as primary argument for balancing against it. Gilley (2011) acknowledges that Canada's strategic options are intrinsically linked to how China will approach the international status quo.…”

Section: Implications For Canadamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Conversely, if China adopts a mildly revisionist outlook, selected engagement will be desirable (Gilley, 2011). Similarly, Holland (2021) believes that adopting a U.S.-centric Free and Open Indo Pacific (FOIP) vision to the region would reaffirm Canada's standing as a middle power committed to the Liberal International Order and its normative ideals and strengthen its relationship with the U.S. and other Western allies. Looking at Canada's historic strategic role in the Asia-Pacific, McDonough (2012) suggests that Canada will, in fact, most likely defer to the U.S. for its strategic leaning given that the deterioration of Canada's relationship with China is seen as less impactful than a deterioration of its long-standing relationship with Washington (Holland, 2021;McDonough, 2012).…”

Section: Implications For Canadamentioning

confidence: 99%

Canada-China Relations in the Age of Great Power Competition: An Assessment of Canadian Foreign Policy Decision Making and Strategic Outlook

Denis¹

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Canada has, so far, awkwardly navigated the current U.S.-China geopolitical competition undertaking an ambiguous position, often labeled as inaction in policy circles, that has rendered any foreign policy decisions difficult to assess from a strategic perspective. Despite bilateral frictions that saw Sino-Canadian relations brought to their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970, the Canadian government has yet to embark on a policy direction that would see it in strategic opposition to China regardless of the path its closest ally and current hegemon, the United States, has set for itself. The Canadian government has, in fact, adopted a hedging approach to the U.S.-China rivalry. Canadian foreign policy decision making, despite being in contradiction to traditional international theories that would see it balance with Washington, is consistent with Canada's policy of engagement towards China which emphasizes the need to work constructively with Beijing and the irrationality of containment for Canadian interests. Structural level theories, in treating middle powers like Canada as policytakers in the same manner as lesser powers, forgo their very role as supporters and builders of the Liberal International Order and, hence, their strategic commitment to enforcing its core tenets even in the absence of an American buttress. The current state of Canadian foreign policy exhibits an approach to great power competition anchored in the established order that recognizes the drawbacks of both balancing and bandwagoning in light of the framework Washington and Beijing have adopted to their rivalry.

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Canada and the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Cited by 6 publications

References 18 publications

Canada’s Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity: Cooperation and Diplomatic Presence in Southeast Asia

Canada’s Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity: Cooperation and Diplomatic Presence in Southeast Asia

Developing a Canadian Indo-Pacific geopolitical orientation

Canada-China Relations in the Age of Great Power Competition: An Assessment of Canadian Foreign Policy Decision Making and Strategic Outlook

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