Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?

Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth

“…Of course, there are interesting (and difficult) issues regarding the relativistic notions of immediate pragmatic relevance: once speech acts such as assertion are understood in terms of these notions, it is not clear whether we may still think of them as aiming to, or as being (constitutively) normed by, truth or correctness (Evans (1985), MacFarlane (2005), García-Carpintero (2008), Field (2009)), so that it is not clear whether we can still make sense of assertion as a norm-governed practice (Caso (2014), Greenough (2011), MacFarlane ( 2014)) or we have to make sense of assertion under a different way of conceptualizing it-e.g., in terms of commitments rather than aims (MacFarlane ( 2005)). More recently, Gariazzo (2016Gariazzo ( , 2019 has claimed that assessment-sensitivity can be made sense of only piecemeal, taking one area of discourse at a time, and that usual ways of doing so are not successful. However, even if thorny, these issues are orthogonal to the issue of the compatibility of truth relativism with the claim that our ordinary truth predicate obeys one (suitably restricted) version of (EQ) or other.…”