2004
DOI: 10.1556/revsoc.10.2004.1.3
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Can Voters Be Equal? A Cross-national Analysis

Abstract: Abstract:The paper empirically tests the proposition that because of the unequal social distribution of politically relevant resources, some groups of citizens may be less successful in expressing their specifically political preferences in the vote than others. Hence, the electoral arena may give different people different degrees of political influence even when the formal equality of all citizens before the law is rigorously upheld in the electoral process. The first part of the paper explores the assumptio… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 31 publications
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“…Font and Virós 1995), and this is what we see here as well, with the effect turning negative and statistically significant in Moldova only. The only result really contradicting previous findings in Tóka's (2003) cross-national comparison is that the impact of rural residence on knowledge is not significant in any of these analyses.…”
Section: Effects Of Social Inequalities On Turnout and Political Knowcontrasting
confidence: 96%
“…Font and Virós 1995), and this is what we see here as well, with the effect turning negative and statistically significant in Moldova only. The only result really contradicting previous findings in Tóka's (2003) cross-national comparison is that the impact of rural residence on knowledge is not significant in any of these analyses.…”
Section: Effects Of Social Inequalities On Turnout and Political Knowcontrasting
confidence: 96%
“…While the work noted above provides independent evidence of information effects, these and many other studies interested in political information tend to focus only on a single country and, in many cases, single elections (but see Tóka, 2003Tóka, , 2004. As argued here, there are reasons to expect that the strength of the informationconsiderations relationship will vary as a function of the complexity of the decision environment.…”
Section: Why Does Information Heterogeneity Matter?mentioning
confidence: 88%
“…For example, Richard Johnston and his colleagues (1996) use data from a survey of opinion about the 1992 Canadian Charlottetown Accord to show information-group differences in the factors that are employed in the decision calculus. According to Johnston et al (1996), while feelings play a role in the decision regardless of information level, in the high information group Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 07:06 22 December 2014 32 J. Roy these considerations are incorporated into more complex and consistent reasoning chains.While the work noted above provides independent evidence of information effects, these and many other studies interested in political information tend to focus only on a single country and, in many cases, single elections (but see Tóka, 2003Tóka, , 2004. As argued here, there are reasons to expect that the strength of the informationconsiderations relationship will vary as a function of the complexity of the decision environment.…”
mentioning
confidence: 88%
“…First, we have used a more realistic point of reference regarding political knowledge than previous analyses (e.g. Bartels, 1996; Hansen, 2009; Tóka, 2004). Compared to these studies, we have utilized additional political knowledge gained in the course of this deliberation that is real rather than stipulated.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous studies have assessed the effect of political knowledge in the context of US elections (Althaus, 1998; Bartels, 1996), in single European countries (Hansen, 2009 for Denmark; Oscarsson, 2007 for Sweden) and in a broader comparative perspective (Tóka, 2004). The single-country studies compare actual (self-reported) voter choices to counterfactual fully informed choices (Althaus, 1998; Bartels, 1996; Hansen, 2009; Oscarsson, 2007), while Tóka (2004) applies information levels that are less than full but nonetheless arbitrary. The problem with these operationalizations is that the counterfactual information levels are either unrealistic or artificial, reflecting the fact that researchers do not know how much knowledge increase can be realistically expected.…”
Section: Research Design and Measurementmentioning
confidence: 99%