2019
DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1747
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Can Volunteer Forces Deter Great Power War? Evidence from the Baltics

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Cited by 7 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…However, such studies were limited to transfusion during the first 24 h and generally involved delays of less than an hour to access medical treatment facilities; furthermore, these facilities frequently provided Role 3 support 22 . Moreover, future conflicts may present singular characteristics such as the re‐emergence of inter‐state conflicts involving a lack of air superiority, tank battles, and mass casualties 23–27 . Finally, to enable improvements in blood supply in current overseas military operations and enhance preparations for future conflicts, this study aimed to detail each step of the process of transfusing combat casualties in the Sahel‐Sahara strip.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, such studies were limited to transfusion during the first 24 h and generally involved delays of less than an hour to access medical treatment facilities; furthermore, these facilities frequently provided Role 3 support 22 . Moreover, future conflicts may present singular characteristics such as the re‐emergence of inter‐state conflicts involving a lack of air superiority, tank battles, and mass casualties 23–27 . Finally, to enable improvements in blood supply in current overseas military operations and enhance preparations for future conflicts, this study aimed to detail each step of the process of transfusing combat casualties in the Sahel‐Sahara strip.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These attacks created an “information blockade” that temporarily prevented the Georgian government from communicating directly with its citizens and the international community. This allowed the Kremlin to fill the void with its own narrative that shaped early perceptions about the war, including blaming the Saakashvili government for instigating the conflict and justifying Russian occupation as “peacekeeping” (Beehner et al, 2018).…”
Section: Digital Counterpublics In Georgia: a Crisis Of Self-determin...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When summarised, a few perspectives constantly appear in the body of literature. First, there is the mainstream argument about the realpolitik nature of the decision and how GS states usually respond to the conflicts about the GN, especially those fought between the US, Europe, and aspiring great powers such as China and Russia (Ciorcaori, 2009;Wohlforth, 2009;Herring, 2013;Trenin, 2014;Murphy, 2017;Beehner & Collins, 2020). Meanwhile, some experts argue about the possibility of absolute gain as the main driving factor of the GS states (Oğultürk, 2017;Miskimmon & O'Loughlin, 2017).…”
Section: Diandra Ayu Larasatimentioning
confidence: 99%