Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?

Staffel, Julia

doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0209-5

Cited by 34 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…We must be aware, though, that credences are either theoretical constructs and so they should play a role most suitable for our fundamental epistemological principles, or they are primary concepts which cannot be further reduced. It should be noted, though, that there are no real reasons credences couldn't also take part in the empirical reasoning of common people [21] and my conceptual clarification could well serve as a basis for further empirical research of credences.…”

Section: The Sleeping Beauty Problemmentioning

confidence: 92%

Why Credences Cannot be Imprecise

Trpin¹

2014

: Interdiscip. Descr. Complex Syst.

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Beliefs formed under uncertainty come in different grades, which are called credences or degrees of belief. The most common way of measuring the strength of credences is by ascribing probabilities to them. What kind of probabilities may be used remains an open question and divides the researchers in two camps: the sharpers who claim that credences can be measured by the standard single-valued precise probabilities. The non-sharpers, on the other hand, claim that credences are imprecise and can only be measured by imprecise probabilities. The latter view has recently gained in popularity. According to non-sharpers, credences must be imprecise when the evidence is essentially imprecise (ambiguous, vague, conflicting or scarce).This view is, however, misleading. Imprecise credences can lead to irrational behaviour and do not make much sense after a closer examination. I provide a coherence-based principle which enables me to demonstrate that there is no need for imprecise credences. This principle is then applied to three special cases, which are prima facie best explained by use of imprecise credences: the jellyfish guy case, Ellsberg paradox and the Sleeping Beauty problem.The jellyfish guy case deals with a strange situation, where the evidence is very ambiguous. Ellsberg Paradox demonstrates a problem that occurs when comparing precise and imprecise credences. The Sleeping Beauty problem demonstrates that imprecise credences are not useless, but rather misguided. They should be understood as sets of possible precise credences, of which only one can be selected at a given time.

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Section: The Sleeping Beauty Problemmentioning

confidence: 92%

Why Credences Cannot be Imprecise

Trpin¹

2014

: Interdiscip. Descr. Complex Syst.

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“…In order to increase its expressiveness, a belief can be modulated by a graduation, making it possible to model different levels of belief, for example making the difference between low, rather low, rather high and high beliefs. This notion of modulated belief is essential in belief representation, as for instance discussed in works in the domains of philosophy of mind and epistemology [11,21,20]. Indeed, binary beliefs offer a model that is too limited to be realistic.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fuzzy Take on Graded Beliefs

Legastelois

Lesot

d’Allonnes

2017

Advances in Fuzzy Logic and Technology 2017

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Graded beliefs increase the expressiveness of any model representing beliefs, by allowing the introduction of modulation: it is then possible to model different levels of belief. The increased expressiveness raises issues regarding the interpretation of these levels as well as their combination. This paper addresses this issue proposing a fuzzy interpretation of graded beliefs, viewed as a fuzzy subset of the universe of well formed formulae, considering belief degrees as membership degrees to a belief set. It studies the consequences of this interpretation, for the definition of graded belief manipulation rules and of graded variants of the doxastic axioms KD45, leading to the proposition of conjunction, disjunction, negation, implication and introspection rules for graded beliefs.

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“…In such cases one belief is non-inferentially based on another belief.22 For a partial defense of the view that credences can figure into inferential reasoning, seeStaffel (2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

Suspension-to-suspension justification principles

Murphy¹

2020

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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We will be in a better position to evaluate some important skeptical theses if we first investigate two questions about justified suspended judgment. One question is this: when, if ever, does one justified suspension confer justification on another suspension? And the other is this: what is the structure of justified suspension? The goal of this essay is to make headway at answering these questions. After surveying the four main views about the non-normative nature of suspended judgment and offering a taxonomy of the epistemic principles that might govern which suspended judgments are justified, I will isolate five important principles that might govern which suspended judgments are justified. I will call these suspension-to-suspension principles. I will then evaluate these principles by the lights of each of the four views about what suspensions are. I close by drawing some conclusions about the prospects for skepticism, the structure of justified suspended judgment, and the importance of theorizing about justified suspended judgment.

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Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?

Cited by 34 publications

References 13 publications

Why Credences Cannot be Imprecise

Why Credences Cannot be Imprecise

A Fuzzy Take on Graded Beliefs

Suspension-to-suspension justification principles

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