Can Testimony Transmit Understanding?

Malfatti, Federica Isabella

doi:10.1111/theo.12220

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Recently, however, this contention has been questioned. At least some kinds of understanding can be acquired directly from testimony (Boyd 2017 ; Malfatti 2019 , 2020 , 2021 ; Green 2019 ; Grimm 2019 ). This position can be motivated in the following ways.…”

Section: True Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Helping Others to Understand: A Normative Account of the Speech Act of Explanation

Gaszczyk

2023

Topoi

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This paper offers a normative account of the speech act of explanation with understanding as its norm. The previous accounts of the speech act of explanation rely on the factive notion of understanding and maintain that proper explanations require knowledge. I argue, however, that such accounts are too demanding and do not reflect the everyday practice of explanation and the attribution of understanding. Instead, I argue that the non-factive, objectual attitude of understanding is sufficient for a proper explanation. On the normative level, explanations are governed by an audience-centred norm, i.e., they are sensitive to the epistemic position of the audience. According to the proposed account, an explanation is a communicative act in which one puts the audience in a position to understand the explained phenomenon. This proposal fits into the recent wave of applications of the normative account and makes space for the pluralism of illocutionary acts.

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Section: True Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Helping Others to Understand: A Normative Account of the Speech Act of Explanation

Gaszczyk

2023

Topoi

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“…For example, if you know that your friend has an early class to teach, and that your friend knows that there is construction on the road to the university, then it involves little effort to understand why your friend left their house especially early this morning (Boyd 2017: 14). Malfatti (2020; see also Malfatti 2019) argues that understanding can be transmitted through testimony without significantly more effort on the receiver's end than in cases of knowledge through testimony. However, Malfetti's argument would not undermine the current solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy since it would, in conjunction with the argument below, simply show that there is a wider range of epistemic states (viz.…”

Section: Understanding and Direct Egoismmentioning

confidence: 99%

We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves

Dellsén¹

2021

Epistemic Autonomy

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We are often urged to figure things out for ourselves rather than to rely on other people's say-so, and thus be 'epistemically autonomous' in one sense of the term. But why? For almost any important question, there will be someone around you who is at least as well placed to answer it correctly. So why bother making up your own mind at all? I consider, and then reject, two 'egoistic' answers to this question according to which thinking for oneself is beneficial for the autonomous agent herself. I go on to suggest that the reason we should (sometimes) think for ourselves is that doing so (sometimes) increases the collective reliability of the epistemic community to which we belong. In many cases, this will do nothing at all to increase our own chances of forming correct beliefs. So, at least in this respect, the rationale for being epistemically autonomous is entirely 'altruistic'.reliably forming true beliefs, since ex hypothesi I am no more likely -and often less likely -to form correct beliefs by going it alone than by relying on others. Thus, in so far as I am thinking only of my own beliefs about public facts, and only of the likely truth-value of those beliefs, I apparently have no reason to figure things out for myself.And yet isn't there something objectionable about relying to such an extent on other people's say-so? Various Enlightenment thinkers, including Descartes (1985/1628), Locke (1975/1689 and Kant (1991Kant ( /1784, appear to have thought so -an idea that is encoded in the widely-cited informal 'fallacy' known as 'appeal to authority'. Let us call the tension between these two thoughts the Puzzle of EpistemicAutonomy. The puzzle, in short, is how to explain the value of critically evaluating claims for oneself in a world where there is almost always someone out there whose opinion is at least as likely to be correct as the opinion you would form on your own. Professional philosophers should take special interest in solving this puzzle, since their role in the educational system is often thought to consist largely in cultivating epistemic autonomy in their students (e.g., Nussbaum 2017). Indeed, an entire genre

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“…In response, Malfatti challenges P2 (and, by extension, P4). She appeals to a case in which you have two sources of evidence that p , one testimonial and the other based on memory of certain firsthand experiences, noting that in such a case your understanding “seems to be perfectly compatible with partial trust [in the speaker]” (Malfatti, 2020, p. 12). Agreed.…”

Section: Epistemic Trust and Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding by Testimony: A Reply to Malfatti

Gilbertson

2020

Theoria

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Federica Malfatti criticizes recent arguments against the possibility of understanding transmission. While she offers no positive argument for the claim that understanding can be transmitted, she does defend a liberal conception of transmission that allows for the possibility of understanding transmission. In this article, I have three aims. First, I will show that there is a stronger version of one of the arguments against understanding transmission that Malfatti considers, which avoids her objection. This argument also fails, however, and the reason it fails suggests that if understanding cannot be transmitted this is not due to the nature of epistemic trust. Second, I will offer a positive argument for understanding transmission on Malfatti's behalf, and defend the view of understanding on which it depends. Finally, I will raise a further challenge to the proponent of understanding transmission. The upshot is that although Malfatti is right that we have no clear reason to exclude the possibility of understanding transmission – and, if I am right, we have positive reason to accept it – nevertheless a puzzle remains about such transmission.

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Can Testimony Transmit Understanding?

Cited by 7 publications

References 28 publications

Helping Others to Understand: A Normative Account of the Speech Act of Explanation

Helping Others to Understand: A Normative Account of the Speech Act of Explanation

We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves

Understanding by Testimony: A Reply to Malfatti

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