Can Science Cope with More Than One World? A Cross-Reading of Habermas, Popper, and Searle

Albinus, Lars

doi:10.1007/s10838-013-9221-9

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…This is epistemic to the extent that our epistemic resources can be discovered, through reflection, as standing behind us (rather than in a completely independent reality that we face as being in front of us). However, it is a non ‐ epistemic reality to the extent that the path to complete awareness of it lies beyond human capabilities, which are always restricted: it would be a contradiction to imagine that we could gain access to the totality of our life‐world because ‘this would be the same as to see ourselves looking’ (Albinus, , p. 5). Nevertheless, such a life‐world is a human‐cultural dimension (even if it is not completely attainable), and so here the epistemic side seems to prevail.…”

Section: Epistemic and Non‐epistemic Dimensions Of Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The life‐world determines what we make the physical world out to be , by dealing with it, cognizing it, and inhabitating it. The life‐world is our communicative frame of orientation in a physical world’ (Albinus, , pp. 6–7).…”

Section: Epistemic and Non‐epistemic Dimensions Of Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, in order to highlight its pragmatic and non‐metaphysical character, Habermas reads the distinction between nature and culture as emerging from a historical and natural development; as Lars Albinus clarifies, ‘Habermas’ theory is that the differentiation between various validity claims has evolved contingently , but irreversibly, in the course of history, owing to the communicative potential of language. In principle, this linguistically grounded differentiation prevents us from conflating what is true with what is right or expressively authentic, and from identifying right or wrong with what inspires attraction or repulsion, let alone with empirical fact’ (Albinus, , p. 5, my italics).…”

Section: An Authentic Concept Of Learningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Janus-faced Approach to Learning. A Critical Discussion of Habermas' Pragmatic Approach

Italia

2016

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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Section: Epistemic and Non‐epistemic Dimensions Of Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epistemic and Non‐epistemic Dimensions Of Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: An Authentic Concept Of Learningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Janus-faced Approach to Learning. A Critical Discussion of Habermas' Pragmatic Approach

Italia

2016

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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“… 3. In many ways, the criticism of Brandom appears to be a new take on the argument already offered by Habermas in regard with Popperian concept of World 3 (Habermas 1984, 76ff; cf. Albinus 2013). For Habermas critique of other cognitive accounts of language, see Habermas 2001b. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 10. It hence appears incorrect to maintain—as Albinus (2013) does—that the main division is between the lifeworld and the objective world. …”

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confidence: 99%

What Brandom won’t make explicit

Michalska

2017

Philosophy & Social Criticism

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In this contribution, I refer to a discussion between Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom on the latter’s normative pragmatics as advanced in Making it Explicit. Parting with Habermas, I intend to show that though both normative pragmatics and formal pragmatics postulate similar discursive ideals, the former, as compared with the latter, is not a particularly well-calibrated critical tool. I argue that whereas Brandom focuses on making conceptual norms explicit, and takes mutual recognition among participants to a linguistic practice for granted, Habermas proposes a universal frame of reference (to oneself, each other, and the world), which delineates what should be taken as a paradigm case of perception and (inter-)action, and thus a normative standard according to which all kinds of human endeavors can be judged. Thus construed, the formal frame of reference points to possible perceptual distortions along any of the three dimensions: the subjective, social, and objective worlds.

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The Paradox of Modernity: Current Debates and Their Implications for the Seventeenth Century

Reddy¹

2015

Mod. Intell. Hist.

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Talk of modernity is plagued with paradox. A relativist stance towards modernity—the claim, for example, that modernity is just one cultural configuration among others—seems to contradict itself. The concept of “cultural configuration,” and similar notions (such as “language game,” “discourse,” “community,” or “myth”), are themselves the products of modern intellectual research and debate. If the relativist claim is true, it appears to undermine the validity of those very conditions of modern intellectual debate that make the claim thinkable. But to argue for modernity's superiority over other cultural configurations seems equally problematic. If the criteria of superiority are themselves modern, then the argument appears question-begging. But if the criteria are not modern, then these non-modern criteria (by which the superiority of the modern can be discerned) would appear themselves to be superior to modern criteria.

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Can Science Cope with More Than One World? A Cross-Reading of Habermas, Popper, and Searle

Cited by 4 publications

References 3 publications

A Janus-faced Approach to Learning. A Critical Discussion of Habermas' Pragmatic Approach

A Janus-faced Approach to Learning. A Critical Discussion of Habermas' Pragmatic Approach

What Brandom won’t make explicit

The Paradox of Modernity: Current Debates and Their Implications for the Seventeenth Century

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