Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes?

Arnold, Scot A.; McNicol, David L.; Fasana, Kenton G.

doi:10.21236/ada491740

2008

DOI: 10.21236/ada491740

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Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes?

Scot A. Arnold¹,

David L. McNicol²,

Kenton G. Fasana³

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2023

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“…Arnold et al (2008) found little variation in profit margins across contract types (fixed price, incentive based, etc). Whereas I do not differentiate between the types, some articles have(Kang and Miller forthcoming;Flammer 2018).…”

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confidence: 92%

Lobbying for government appropriations

Cox

2023

The RAND J of Economics

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This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Lastly, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.

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confidence: 92%

Lobbying for government appropriations

Cox

2023

The RAND J of Economics

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Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes?

Cited by 1 publication

References 8 publications

Lobbying for government appropriations

Lobbying for government appropriations

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