Can P2P Technology Benefit Eyeball ISPs? A Cooperative Profit Distribution Answer

Abstract

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology has been promoting the development of Internet applications, like Video on Demand (VoD) and file sharing. However, under the traditional pricing mechanism, the fact that most P2P traffic flows among peers can dramatically decrease the profit of ISPs, who may take actions against P2P and impede the adoption of P2P-assisted applications. So far, there is no proper profit distribution mechanism to solve this problem. In this paper, we develop a mathematical framework to analyze such economic issues. Inspired by the idea from cooperative game theory, we propose a cooperative profit-distribution model based on Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), in which both eyeball ISPs and Peer-assisted Content Providers (PCPs) form coalitions and compute a fair Pareto point to determine profit distribution. Moreover, we design a fair and feasible mechanism for profit distribution within each coalition and give a model to discuss the potential competition among ISPs. We show that such a cooperative method not only guarantees the fair profit distribution among network participants, but also improves the economic efficiency of the network system; and the potential competition among ISPs will make the network more efficient. This paper systematically studies solutions to unbalanced profit distribution caused by P2P and presents a feasible cooperative method to increase and fairly distribute the profit.

A bargaining game theoretic method for virtual resource allocation in LTE-based cellular networks

“…By observing problem (4), we note that the problem is an integer-programming problem [9]. As the parameters c m and c n,k to be optimized are in terms of integers, there exists no polynomial time-complexity algorithm to solve the problem [19].…”

“…Hence, the performance variation of the MNO or a WSP (due to e.g., the variation of channel conditions) would not lead to the performance degradation of other WSPs (or the MNO). We use the Nash bargaining cooperative game [9,10] to model the VR allocation problem. The formulated game is termed as the cooperative VR allocation game (VRAG).…”

“…It is obviously that the logarithmic type functions (2) and (3) are convex. So U MNO and U WSP,n are convex since both of them are sum of convex functions.Proposition 1 indicates that the proposed VRAG has a unique solution, called the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), which can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem[9] MaxQ,Q = U MNO − U min MNO N n=1 U WSP,n − U min WSP,n ,(4)s.t. c m = 1, 2, .…”

Sponsored Data Plan

“…Hande et al [16] set up a two-sided model in a rate allocation market and concluded that subsidizing end users' cost of connectivity by pricing content providers may benefit both end users and CPs. Xu et al [18] proposed a cooperative profit-distribution model for eyeball ISPs and peer-assisted content providers based on Nash Bargaining Solution. Authors in [13,14] studied the profit-sharing mechanism of multi-lateral ISP settlements.…”

Cooperative Trading Mechanism and Satisfaction-Based Profit Distribution in a Multi-Energy Community

“…The other key work of EC is to guarantee the fairness of profit distribution inside, which is the distribution of the entire profit gained by EC to each individual prosumer inside EC. It can affect the participation willingness of prosumers (Xu et al, 2014). A Nash-type non-cooperative game theory approach distributes prosumers' profit by introducing a spontaneous competition among them (Long et al, 2019;Jing et al, 2020).…”