Can Observers Predict Trustworthiness?

Abstract

Abstract-We investigate whether experimental subjects can predict behavior in a prisoner's dilemma played on a TV show. Subjects report probabilistic beliefs that a player cooperates, before and after the players communicate. Subjects correctly predict that women and players who make a voluntary promise are more likely to cooperate. They are able to distinguish truth from lies when a player is asked about her intentions by the host. Subjects are to some extent able to predict behavior; their beliefs are 7 percentage points higher for cooperators than for defectors. We also study their Bayesian updating. Beliefs do not satisfy the martingale property and display mean reversion.He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his fingertips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.-Sigmund Freud (1905)

Beauty and the Sources of Discrimination

“…13 It is possible that attractive people are perceived as being more cooperative even though they are not really so, so that selection decisions are driven by incorrect beliefs. While we do not observe the beliefs of participants on the show, a companion paper (Belot et al (2008)) experimentally investigates third party perceptions of trustworthiness. Experimental subjects watched a random sample of shows and were asked to report a probability that a player would share.…”

“…This was based on watching short silent video fragments of the game show in which a player introduced him or herself. We ensured that all five players on any show were rated 6 These are considerable sums given that the median disposable monthly income of a full-time employed person in the Netherlands was about €1,200 in 2000 (Statistics Netherlands, available at www.cbs.nl).…”

How Private is Private Information? The Ability to Spot Deception in an Economic Game

“…Another limitation of these studies is that people are commonly instructed to tell the truth or a lie. This may create a bias in the accuracy of lie detection, as poor liars that would not normally attempt to deceive anyone are now asked to deceive, and people may feel less morally burdened if they are instructed to lie (see Belot et al 2012, for a discussion of these and other limitations). Finally, many of these studies are focused on settings that have little to do with economically relevant situations.…”

“…The most related study to ours is by Belot et al (2012), who studied the ability to detect deceit in the context of a television game show where contestants play a highstakes simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game. Contestants take their decision after a round of free format communication.…”

Predictably Angry: Facial Cues Provide a Credible Signal of Destructive Behavior

“…Several studies suggest that people do better than chance in detecting who cooperates in social dilemmas, such as a prisoner's dilemma or public good game (Belot, Bhaskar, and van de Ven 2012;Brosig 2002;Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977;Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993;Kovács-Bálint, Bereczkei, and Hernádi 2013;Tognetti et al 2013;Verplaetse, Vanneste, and Braeckman 2007;Vogt, Efferson, and Fehr 2013;Yamagishi 2003), who reciprocates trust in a trust game Centorrino, Djemai, Hopfensitz, Milinski and Seabright, 2011;De Neys, Hopfensitz and Bonnefon, 2013;Efferson and Vogt, 2013;Stirrat and Perrett, 2010), who tries to exploit private information in a bargaining game (Ockenfels and Selten, 2000), who gives positive amounts in a dictator game (Fetchenhauer, Groothuis and Pradel, 2010), and who offers high amounts in an UG (Jaschke, Primes and Koppensteiner, 2013). The reported accuracy rates are typically modest but significant.…”