Can international organizations be democratic? A skeptic's view

Dahl, Robert A.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511586361.003

Cited by 414 publications

(213 citation statements)

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“…A first perspective -the pessimists -argues that European integration has negative effects on national democracy, because fundamental political decisions can no longer be made at the place where debate and political conflict about them occur (Dahl 1999). Thus, Schmidt (2006) states that democracy requires 'politics' (debate, conflict and choice) to decide which 'policies' (legislative output) to implement.…”

Section: Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: the differentiated politicisation of European governance

Wilde

Leupold

Schmidtke

2015

West European Politics

304

164

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Section: Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: the differentiated politicisation of European governance

Wilde

Leupold

Schmidtke

2015

West European Politics

304

164

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…IOs are often too far removed from democratic processes to face effective pressure from local people who are affected by their actions. Member states require a broad, and therefore difficult to obtain, consensus to reform or terminate IOs (Dahl 1999, Nye 2001. These challenges raise fundamental concerns about the roles IOs play in international affairs (da Conceição-Heldt 2013, Delreux and Kerremans 2010, Elsig 2007, Frey and Stutzer 2006, Haftel and Thompson 2006, Lake 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability in Global Governance: Civil Society Claims for Environmental Performance at the World Bank

Buntaine

2014

Int Stud Q

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International organizations frequently lack accountability to both states and civil society groups. States often face difficulties monitoring the actions of international organizations. Civil society groups do not often enjoy direct influence over decision‐making within international organizations. To address these challenges, states have created accountability mechanisms for international organizations. Accountability mechanisms allow civil society groups to submit complaints about the performance of international organizations. They take the form of ombudsmen offices, accountability panels, and complaint procedures. Little is known about when and why these mechanisms constrain behavior by international organizations that runs counter to the mutual interests of states and civil society groups. Using the World Bank Inspection Panel as a test case, I show that monitoring by civil society groups alters lending at the World Bank when it enhances oversight by powerful states. By combining their abilities in sanctioning and monitoring, states and civil society groups can promote accountability at international organizations.

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“…4 The opposing 3 On consideration of applying democratic principles to IOs in general, see Dahl (1999) and Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik (2009). While they do not devote much space to questions of representation in IOs, the authors demonstrate that domestic democracy is not necessarily weakened by the activities of multilateral institutions; also see Rabkin (1998).…”

Section: Representation In Legislative Bodiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representation and Governance in International Organizations

Rapkin

Strand

Trevathan

2016

PaG

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What does representation mean when applied to international organizations? While many scholars working on normative questions related to global governance often make use of the concept of representation, few have addressed specifics of applying the concept to the rules and practices by which IOs operate. This article examines representation as a fundamental, albeit often neglected, norm of governance which, if perceived to be deficient or unfair, can interfere with other components of governance, as well as with performance of an organization's core tasks by undermining legitimacy. We argue that the concept of representation has been neglected in the ongoing debates about good governance and democratic deficits within IOs. We aim to correct this by drawing on insights from normative political theory considerations of representation. The article then applies theoretical aspects of representation to the governance of the International Monetary Fund. We determine that subjecting IOs to this kind of conceptual scrutiny highlights important deficiencies in representational practices in global politics. Finally, our conclusion argues scholars of global governance need to address the normative and empirical implications of conceptualizing representation at the supranational level.

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Can international organizations be democratic? A skeptic's view

Cited by 414 publications

References 0 publications

Introduction: the differentiated politicisation of European governance

Introduction: the differentiated politicisation of European governance

Accountability in Global Governance: Civil Society Claims for Environmental Performance at the World Bank

Representation and Governance in International Organizations

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