Can fictionalists have faith?

Abstract

According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a 'positive cognitive attitude'. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This paper shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given nondoxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions in a discourse is of little consequence for fictionalists, whereas their truth matters deeply for the faithful. Although promising, this approach incurs several theoretical costs, hence providing a compelling reason to favour a purely doxastic account of faith.

Agnosticism II: Actions and attitudes

“…But assuming that fictionalism is compatible with both atheism and agnosticism, why think that it fits the latter particularly well? One response is that an atheist—as opposed to an agnostic—may simply lack the motivation to engage in a practice that he treats as religious (and not just social or aesthetic) without believing that it is possible to acquire from it some supernatural (and not just social or aesthetic) benefits (see e.g., Malcolm, 2018, p. 8). In short, the fact that an agnostic, as opposed to an atheist, can hope that religion is true can provide her with a reason to engage in religion as fiction.…”

Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends

“…Recently, Malcolm and Scott (2016) argue for doxasticism, and criticize arguments for non-doxasticism, to which I reply in Howard-Snyder (unpublished). More recently still, Malcolm (2017) argues that doxasticism is preferable to non-doxasticism on the grounds indicated above, namely that it alone can unproblematically rule out religious fictionalists as people who have faith. In the context of defending this argument, Malcolm considers whether religious fictionalists can have faith.…”

“…Now: according to Finlay Malcolm (2017), on doxasticism, no religious fictionalist can have faith that there is a God; however, on non-doxasticism, some religious fictionalists can have faith that there is a God. This alleged fact, by Malcolm's lights, favours doxasticism over non-doxasticism.…”

Religious fictionalism

“…Malcolm and Scott () use it, along with a variety of objections to NDF, to defend the position that belief is a necessary condition for propositional faith. One possible way to distinguish fictionalism from the faith as described by the supporter of NDF is in terms of the importance placed on truth (Malcolm, forthcoming). For the fictionalist, the truth of the claims of the discourse do not alter whether she should engage in it.…”