Can Emotion be Modelled on Perception?

Salmela, Mikko

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01259.x

Cited by 80 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Yet, most philosophers agree today that understanding the emotions as deployments of evaluative concepts in judgements is mistaken and the dissenting voices against the perceptual theory are also gaining in strength (Salmela ; Brady ; Deonna and Teroni , chapter 6; Dokic and Lemaire ). The former is cognitively much too demanding to accommodate the emotions of young children and nonhuman animals.…”

Section: Emotion Attitude and Content: Stage‐settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotions as Attitudes

2015

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In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries

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Section: Emotion Attitude and Content: Stage‐settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotions as Attitudes

2015

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“…However, it is quite uncontroversial that emotional experience is not transparent but rather opaque (see de Sousa , 64; Salmela , 68f.). For the transparency thesis to be true of emotions it would have to be the case that whenever we tried to focus our attention on an emotional experience itself, our attention would slip right through the experience to the intentional object of our emotion.…”

Section: Reductive Pure Intentionalism the Transparency Of Experiencmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience: A Look at Perception Theory

Lutz

2015

Dialectica

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In this paper I examine whether different suggestions made in the philosophy of perception can help us to explain and understand the phenomenal character of emotional experience. After having introduced the range of possible positions, I consider qualia-theory, reductive pure intentionalism and reductive impure intentionalism. I argue that qualia-theory can easily explain why emotions are phenomenal states at all but that it cannot account for the "inextricable link thesis" which is quite prominent in the philosophy of emotion. Reductive pure and impure intentionalism, in turn, seem to fit better with this thesis but they have difficulties to explain what makes emotions phenomenal states at all. Therefore, I finally discuss whether nonreductive intentionalism might be an option for explaining the phenomenal character of emotional experience.

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“…6 Critics of the perceptual analogy, inter alia, include Helm 2001, ch. 5;Brady 2009;Mulligan 2010;Salmela 2011;Deonna and Teroni 2012, ch. 6;Whiting 2012;Düringer 2014. Beyond Perceptualism: Introduction to the Special Issue 263 the peaches are ripe will certainly have an influence on what you are doingwhether you eat them or notbut it does not directly motivate your eating them.…”

Section: Beyond Perceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%