Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?

Posłajko, Krzysztof

doi:10.1007/s11406-019-00155-8

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…I find this view problematic: the idea that beliefs metaphysically depend on the process of their ascription leads, in my view, to serious concerns about the epistemology of mental states and about the circularity of the interpretivist theory. I have elaborated on these points elsewhere (Poslajko 2020). What needs to be stressed here is the fact (which was noted in section 2) that minimal non-realism, as presented here, does not imply the claim that beliefs are minddependent in any strong sense.…”

Section: Paradigmatic Positionsmentioning

confidence: 71%

How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

Posłajko

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about truth and existence: it will be assumed that beliefs can be said to exist and their attributions can said to be true. The aim is to show that even when we buy into such assumptions we can meaningfully distinguish between the realist and anti-realist approach to belief. According to the proposal, the paradigmatic anti-realist view on beliefs should be seen as a conjunction of three claims: that belief attributions do not track objective similarities, that beliefs are not causally active, and that there is no viable way of naturalizing content. It will be shown that seeing the debate in the proposed way has important advantages as it allows the issue of belief realism to be made non-trivial and tractable, and it introduces theoretical unity into contemporary metaphysics of beliefs.

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Section: Paradigmatic Positionsmentioning

confidence: 71%

How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

Posłajko

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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“…Byrne 1998). In my paper, I provided an assessment (Poslajko 2020) of the most popular lines of criticism. With regard to the problem of fictionalism, I argued that the versions of interpretivism which accept a deflationary account of existence can easily flout this charge (a paradigmatic example of such a mix of interpretivism and deflationism can be found in Mölder 2010).…”

Section: Interpretivism and Its Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The viability of the interpretivist proposal regarding the reality of beliefs and other propositional attitudes has raged for several decades and show no signs of abating. In my own recent critical piece (Poslajko 2020), I focused on a specific version of interpretivism which is based on the deflationary approach to existence; I argued that it does not provide an adequate account of epistemology and of the metaphysics of beliefs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Folk Psychological Models and the Metaphysics of Belief. A Reply to Curry

Posłajko

2022

Philosophia

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The aim of this paper is to show that Curry’s recent defence of the interpretivist approach to beliefs is unsuccessful. Curry tries to argue that his version of interpretivism, which is based on the model-theoretic approach to folk-psychological attributions, is well-suited to resisting the epistemological argument that is directed at interpretivism. In this paper, I argue that even if Curry’s defence is successful in this case, his theory does not have enough resources to solve the metaphysical problems of interpretivism. In particular, I argue that the model-theoretic version of interpretivism that Curry espouses does not explain the claim that beliefs are constituted by the process of attribution, which is central to the interpretivist project. In the final parts of the paper, I discuss the issue of the relation between interpretivism and other forms of the broadly superficial/deflationary approach to beliefs, especially dispositionalism. I contend that if one wants to adopt a superficial/deflationary approach, it is best not to adopt interpretivism as it is an unnecessarily complex and problematic version of this broad view.

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“…Indeed, I have argued at length (in Curry 2021b, §3.3; 2022, §3) that if dispositionalism is to remain superficial (rather than collapsing into psychofunctionalism), then the mixture with interpretivism that is already baked into Schwitzgebel's account is its only viable route to securing a principled criterion of individuation. 9 In a recent series of papers, Poslajko (2020Poslajko ( , 2021Poslajko ( , 2022 makes it plain that he, like me, wants to resist reduction and hold on to a superficial theory of belief. 10 The central contention of this reply is that in the absence of a viable alternative, non-interpretivist criterion for individuating beliefs (and the dispositions they comprise)-which Poslajko has not offered-any superficial theory must countenance beliefs as being modally dependent on folk psychological models in relation to which they are constituted.…”

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confidence: 99%

Why Dispositionalism Needs Interpretivism: A Reply to Poslajko

Curry

2023

Philosophia

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I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzysztof Poslajko objects that dispositionalism does just fine on its own and, moreover, is better off without interpretivism's metaphysical baggage. I argue that Poslajko is wrong: in order to secure a principled criterion for individuating beliefs, dispositionalism must either collapse into psychofunctionalism (or some other non-superficial theory) or accept interpretivism's hand in marriage.

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Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?

Cited by 4 publications

References 19 publications

How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

Folk Psychological Models and the Metaphysics of Belief. A Reply to Curry

Why Dispositionalism Needs Interpretivism: A Reply to Poslajko

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