Can Coherence Generate Warrant <i>Ex Nihilo</i>? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses

Cleve, James Van

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00487.x

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(26 reference statements)

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“…For formal analyses see vanCleve (2011) andRoche (2012). 17Goodman (1972, p. 63) andScheffler (1954, p. 181) used "initial credibility" for what we call "independent credibility".…”

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confidence: 99%

Reflective equilibrium and understanding

Baumberger

Brun

2020

Synthese

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Elgin has presented an extensive defence of reflective equilibrium embedded in an epistemology which focuses on objectual understanding rather than ordinary propositional knowledge. This paper has two goals: to suggest an account of reflective equilibrium which is sympathetic to Elgin's but includes a range of further developments, and to analyse its role in an account of understanding. We first address the structure of reflective equilibrium as a target state and argue that reflective equilibrium requires more than an equilibrium in the sense of a coherent position (i.e. an agreement of commitments, theory and background theories). On the one hand, the position also needs to be stable between a 'conservative' pull of input commitments and a 'progressive' pull of epistemic goals; on the other hand, reflective equilibrium requires that enough of the resulting commitments have some credibility independent of the coherence of the position. We then turn to the dynamics of reflective equilibrium, the process of mutual adjustment of commitments and theories. Here, the most pressing internal challenges for defenders of reflective equilibrium arise: to characterize this process more exactly and to explain its status in relation to reflective equilibrium as a target state. Finally, we investigate the role of reflective equilibrium in Elgin's account of understanding and argue that objectual understanding cannot be explained in terms of reflective equilibrium alone. An epistemic agent who understands a subject matter by means of a theory also needs to be able to use this theory and the theory needs to meet some external rightness condition.

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“…For formal analyses see vanCleve (2011) andRoche (2012). 17Goodman (1972, p. 63) andScheffler (1954, p. 181) used "initial credibility" for what we call "independent credibility".…”

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confidence: 99%

Reflective equilibrium and understanding

Baumberger

Brun

2020

Synthese

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“…See,Bovens and Hartmann (2003a, b, 2005, Olsson (2000, 2002),,Huemer (1997Huemer ( , 2007Huemer ( , 2011, Warfield (1994, 1996),Meijs and Douven (2007),Merricks (1995),Olsson ( , 2005a,Olsson and Shogenji (2004),Roche (2010Roche ( , 2012,Schubert and Olsson (2012),,Shogenji (1999,van Cleve (2005), and Wheeler (2009 3. See,Bovens and Hartmann (2003a, b, 2005, Olsson (2000, 2002),,Huemer (1997Huemer ( , 2007Huemer ( , 2011, Warfield (1994, 1996),Meijs and Douven (2007),Merricks (1995),Olsson ( , 2005a,Olsson and Shogenji (2004),Roche (2010Roche ( , 2012,Schubert and Olsson (2012),,Shogenji (1999,van Cleve (2005), and Wheeler (2009 3.…”

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Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence

Araszkiewicz¹,

Savelka²

2013

Law and Philosophy Library

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“…23 23 I am not alone in reading BonJour's view in this manner. See van Cleve 2005, 171; 2011, 342–43, and Shogenji 2005a, 314–15. Cf.…”

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“…There might be reason, however, for doubting that Lewis understands “no individual credibility” as in (B). See van Cleve 2005, 170–71; 2011, 340–43.…”

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Witness Agreement and the Truth‐conduciveness of Coherentist Justification

Roche

2012

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that "witness agreement" by itself implies neither an increase in the probability of truth nor a high probability of truth-the witnesses need to have some "individual credibility." It can seem that, from this formal epistemological result, it follows that coherentist justification (i.e., doxastic coherence) is not truth-conducive. I argue that this does not follow. Central to my argument is the thesis that, though coherentists deny that there can be noninferential justification, coherentists do not deny that there can be individual credibility.

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Can Coherence Generate Warrant Ex Nihilo? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses

Cited by 12 publications

References 25 publications

Reflective equilibrium and understanding

Reflective equilibrium and understanding

Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence

Witness Agreement and the Truth‐conduciveness of Coherentist Justification

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