Can cognitive psychological research on reasoning enhance the discussion around moral judgments?

Abstract

In this article we will demonstrate how cognitive psychological research on reasoning and decision making could enhance discussions and theories of moral judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-process models of moral judgments and describe selected studies which support these approaches. However, we will also present data that contradict the model predictions, suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be more complex. In the second part, we will show how cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we will highlight approaches addressing the interaction between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g., harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes, such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations of harm caused.

Reasoning supports forgiving accidental harms

“…Moral dilemmas, like accidents, pose a conflict of a different variety-between the emotionally aversive utilitarian option of personally harming someone and the option of letting a greater number of individuals get hurt. Past work shows that differences in individual's ability to reason and availability of cognitive resources play a role in how this conflict is resolved (for a review, see Bialek & Terbeck, 2016;Trémolière, Neys, & Bonnefon, 2017).…”

Can induced reflection affect moral decision-making?

“…However, we cannot rule out the possibility that responses to moral dilemmas were affected to some extent by the numerical nature of both tasks (see Sirota et al 2018). The requirement to complete either task before responding to dilemmas could potentially make the numeric aspects in dilemmas more salient, thus increasing utilitarian decisions (Bialek & Terbeck, 2016;Bialek, & De Neys, 2017). Feedback may further increase attention to the numerical nature of the tasks.…”

I Think, Therefore I Forgive: The Role of Reasoning in Forgiving Accidental Harms

“…Sacrificial moral dilemmas, like accidents, pose a conflict of a different variety-between the emotionally aversive utilitarian option of personally harming someone and the option of letting a greater number of individuals get hurt. Past work shows that differences in individual's ability to reason and availability of cognitive resources play a role in how this conflict is resolved (for a review, see 13,14 ).…”